Two essays on reputation effects in economic models by Melkonian, Tigran A.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1998
Two essays on reputation effects in economic
models
Tigran A. Melkonian
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Economic Theory Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Melkonian, Tigran A., "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models " (1998). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 11874.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/11874
INFORMATION TO USERS 
This manuscript has been reproduced ftom the microlSlm master. UMI 
films the text directly firom the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be 
fi"om any type of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing fi'om left to right in equal sections with small overiaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to 
order. 
UMI 
A Bell & Howell lofonnation Compaiqr 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Alter MI 48106>1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Two essays on reputation effects in economic models 
by 
Tigran A. Melkonian 
A dissertation submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Major; Economics 
Major Professors: Stanley R. Johnson and Harvey E. Lapan 
Iowa State University 
Ames, lov^^a 
1998 
UHI Ntinber: 9841069 
UMI Microform 9841069 
Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. 
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code. 
UMI 
300 North Zeeb Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103 
II  
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
This is to certify that the Doctoral dissertation of 
Tigran A. Melkonian 
has met the dissertation requirements of Iowa State University 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
in 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
REPUTATION MODELS I 
1.1. Introduction 1 
1.2. The Chain-store Game 2 
1.3. Reputation with a S ingle Long-run Player 12 
1.4. Reputation with Many Long-run Players 24 
CHAPTER 2. THE CHAIN-STORE GAME WITH MULTIPLE 
INCUMBENTS 43 
2.1. Introduction 43 
2.2. The Complete Information Game 54 
2.3. The Incomplete Information Game 58 
2.3.1. Description of the Game 5 8 
2.3.2. One-period Game 60 
2.3.3. Two-period Game 62 
2.3.4. Value of Reputation in a Two-period Game 75 
2.3.5. Game with More than Two Periods 78 
2.4. Conclusions 83 
iv 
CHAPTERS STATE TRADING COMPANIES, TIME 
CONSISTENCY, IMPERFECT ENFORCEABILITY 
AND REPUTATION 86 
3.1. Introduction 86 
3.2. The Perfect Information Game 88 
3.3. The Finitely Repeated Version of the Game Without Commitment 96 
3.4. Imperfect Enforceability, Pooling and Reputation Effects 99 
3.5. Concluding Comments 112 
APPENDIX I BASIC GAME THEORETIC CONCEPTS 119 
APPENDIX II. SOLUTION OF THE TWO-PERIOD GAME 123 
NOTES 160 
REFERENCES 162 
I 
CHAPTER 1. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON REPUTATION 
MODELS 
1.1. Introduction 
In this section we review and discuss the literature on repeated games where some 
players might be able to establish and/or maintain a reputation for choosing certain actions. 
The rough idea of most reputation models is that if the same stage game is played finitely 
or infinitely many times, and if a player'^ opponents have some prior belief (or initial 
reputation) that this player will be taking the same course of action every time the stage 
game is played then the player may try to preserve and/or to develop this reputation. There 
are numerous economic examples where an economic agent might be willing to commit to 
take the same action over a number of periods. For instance, the central bank may always 
implement its announced policy to convince traders that it will keep its promises in the 
fiiture. As another example, a producer may choose a high quality of its product to 
convince potential buyers to choose its brand. The question is whether, given superior 
information of an economic agent, he will be able to effectively commit to his desired 
strategy. 
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1.2. The Chain-store Game 
Many of the first formal game theoretic representations of the reputation models have 
originated from the industrial organization literature. Scherer (1980) indicates that a 
mutlimarket seller might employ sharp price cutting practices in response to entry in one 
market to try to scare off its potential rivals in other markets. Thus, an aggressive response 
to entry is used for demonstration purposes and may deter entry of potential entrants in 
other markets fearing that their entry will be met by the same type of response. Selten 
(1978) formalized this reasoning and called his model a chain-store game. We present a 
slightly modified version of Selten's game. 
First, consider a single stage version of the chain-store game. The game has two 
players, the incumbent and the entrant. The entrant moves first and decides whether to 
enter the market monopolized by the incumbent. Thus, in period 1 the entrant chooses 
between two actions: to enter or to stay out of the market. If the entrant decides to enter, 
then the incumbent has to choose what type of pricing policy to pursue. The incumbent has 
two options: to accommodate (sharing the market "peacefully") or to fight (sharp price 
cutting). If die entrant decides to stay out, then the incumbent is not called upon to move 
and the game ends. The payoffs of the incumbent and the entrant in that case are a > 0 and 
0, respectively. 
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If the entrant enters, the incumbent gets a payoff of 0 if it meets the entry by 
accommodation, and -1 if it fights. The entrant's payoff is -I if it enters and is fought, and 
0 < 6 < 1 if it enters and the incumbent accommodates. The extensive and normal forms 
of the game are presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. If entrant enters then the 
incumbent chooses between 0 if it accommodates and -1 if it fights. Obviously, entry will 
be followed by accommodation. Anticipating this response, the entrant chooses between 0 
if it stays out and b if it enters; hence, the entrant will enter. Thus, the unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium of this game is for the entrant to enter and for the incumbent to 
accommodate. 
Entrant 
enter 
stay out 
Incumbent 
accomodate fight 
1 0 a 
Figure l.l. Single stage of the chain-store game. 
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Entrant 
Enter Stay out 
Accommodate 
Incumbent 
Fight 
Figure 1.2. Normal form of the single stage chain-store game. 
This is not the only Nash equilibrium of the game, though. The strategy profile, where 
the entrant stays out and the incumbent fights if there is entry, is Nash equilibrium. It does 
not cost anything to the incumbent to fight entry since in the equilibrium entry never 
occurs, and the entrant stays out since entry is fought. But, the strategy of tlie incumbent to 
fight is an empty threat, since, if faced with entry, the incumbent's optimal choice is to 
accommodate. 
Suppose die game Just described is played by the single incumbent against N entrants 
sequentially. That is, the game of Figure l.l is played first against player N and the 
outcome becomes known to later entrants, then againstplayer N-\, etc. (Note, that we 
(0,b) (a,0) 
(-1, -1) (a,0) 
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index rime backward.) The payoff to the incumbent is the discounted present value of the 
stage game payoffs (for some discount factor 0 < 5 < 1), and the payoffs of entrants are 
those of a stage game. Consider the last stage of this game. Entrant 1 (the last entrant) 
chooses its action based on prediction of whether the entry will be met by fight or 
accommodation. Staying out is the best choice if entry will be met by rapacious response. 
But entrant 1 recognizes that if it enters then the incumbent has no reason to fight, since 
accommodation is the best response in the short run and the incumbent's choice in the last 
stage affects only the last stage payoff (no more opponents are left to demonstrate 
willingness to fight and hence no long run benefit from fighting). Thus, the last entrant 
enters no matter what the history of the game is up to the last stage and the incumbent 
shares the market peacefully. 
Now, consider second-last market (entrant 2). If there is entry in this market the 
incumbent accommodates, since fighting is costly in the short run and does not affect the 
play in the last stage (by the logic of the previous paragraph). Anticipating that entry will 
be met by accommodation, the second-last entrant enters given any course of action taken 
by players in previous periods-
Carrying this argument backwards to the beginning of the game tree, Selten finds that 
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the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated game is: the incumbent 
accommodates and ail entrants enter for every possible history of the game. 
Selten (1978) argued (and it seems to be a plausible argument) that if this game or a 
similar tj^pe of game were actually played, then we would expect quite a few potential 
entrants to stay out and for the chain store to fight some competitors which entered the 
market. He suspects that the incumbent would fight earlier entrants to discourage entry by 
later entrants. The earlier entrants, expecting this kind of response, would not enter. In the 
later stages of die game, he expects that entry would occur and would be met by 
accommodation. Since the expected behavior and the game theoretic predictions are in 
dissonance, he calls this situation the "chain-store paradox". 
The presented arguments show that in the (subgame perfect) equilibrium of Selten's 
chain-store game the behavior of die incumbent and the entrants is not influenced by the 
outcomes in the previous markets. BCreps and Wilson (1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1982) have shown that the addirion to the chain-store game of a realistic assumption of 
incomplete information on die entrants' part about the incumbent's payoff structure and/or 
the available actions may serve as a mechanism that will allow a connection of behavior in 
"otherwise independent markets". BCreps and Wilson (1982b) assume that the entrants may 
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entertain the conjecture that the incumbent may get some positive utility out of fighting. 
That is, they may put some initial weight on the event that the incumbent's payoff structure 
is such that fighting is a better short run response than accommodation (and not the payoff 
illustrated in Figure l.l). Milgrom and Roberts (1982) consider a richer information 
structure. They assume that entrants believe that the incumbent's feasible set of actions 
may consist of a single response (fight or accommodate). That is, tlie entrants assign 
positive probability to the following three events: i) the incumbent has both actions (fight 
and accommodate) available after the entry occurs; ii) the incumbent has only action 
"fight"; lii) the incumbent has only action "accommodate". As the authors argue (Milgrom 
and Roberts (1982, p. 287), this captures the idea that "a predatory response in one period 
might be a part of a general aggressive pattern, and a cooperative response might be a part 
of a general cooperative pattern". In dieir model, the incumbent has another piece of 
private information: the short-run cost of fighting. To capture the fact that some entrants 
may enter regardless of the anticipated response by the incumbent, Milgrom and Roberts 
assume that the outside opportunity of each entrant (its utility fi"om staying out of the 
market) is its private information and can assume such a value that entering is a strictly 
dominant strategy. 
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We try to briefly sketch a model which is a hybrid of the ones in Kreps and Wilson 
(1982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). The following discussion is mostly drawn from 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) and Chapter 9 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
As in the chain-store game, the game has + 1 players. Player 0 is the long-run 
incumbent who has a monopoly in N distinct markets and faces potential entry in each of 
these markets by short-run firms (Players M,..., 1). The game has N stages. In the n-th 
stage. Player n, having observed the outcomes of all previous contests (stage games 
N,...,n + I), chooses whether to enter or to stay out of the market n and the incumbent, in 
case entry occurs, decides whether to fight or to accommodate the entry. The outcome of 
this stage game becomes known to all subsequent players. 
The entrants assess initial probability p, that the incumbent is "tough" meaning that its 
payoffs are such that it will fight entry in every market along the equilibrium path. The 
incumbent is "weak" with probability (1 - p). The weak incumbent's payoffs for the stage 
game are as in Figure l.l, for each possible outcome of the stage game. Each of the 
entrants can have two possible types, "tough" with probability q or "weak" with probability 
(1 -^). Tough entrants always enter (this can be modeled by assuming that the strategy 
space of tough entrants is singleton, consisting of "enter"). The weak entrant's payoffs for 
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the possible outcomes of the stage game are as given in Figure 1.1. Each entrant's type is 
private information and is distributed independently of other entrants' types and of the 
incumbent's type. The incumbent's objective is maximization of the average discounted 
payoff which is a sum of discounted stage game payoffs. 
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we discuss some of the properties that any 
equilibrium (we focus on a sequential equilibrium) of this game will possess. First, any 
equilibrium of this game will have the tough incumbent fight every entry along the 
equilibrium path and tough entrants enter for any history of the game. This Is the case 
because the strategies indicated above are strictly dominant for the players. Second, each 
entrant's strategy has to be the short-run best response to the incumbent's strategy. Third, 
the weak incumbent accommodates in the last stage for every possible history of the game 
since there is no value of maintaining a reputation. 
Note diat the weak incumbent is willing to fight entry only if figliting will deter some of 
the future entrants and if the benefit fi-om entry deterrence covers fighting costs. Thus, the 
weak incumbent fights entry only if the potential payoff fi-om fighting a(l - q) - q exceeds 
the payoff from accommodating which is 0. 
The unique sequential equilibrium outcome of this game has the following 
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characteristics: 
i) Cost of maintaining a reputation exceeds its long-run potential benefit: q > a/(a + I) 
Weak incumbent accommodates to every entry and weak entrant enters if 
p < bl{b + 1). Note, entry occurs early in the game and the weak incumbent's payoff tends 
to 0 as the number of stages increases; 
ii) Maintaining a reputation has a potential long-run benefit: q  < a!{a+{)  
In this case, there exists a number n{p)  such that the weak incumbent fights in the first 
N~n{p) markets, and weak entrants in these markets stay out accordingly. The average 
payoff of the incumbent tends to (1 - q)a - ^ as the number of stages increases. 
Note, that in case ii) the long run opportunity cost of accommodation exceeds the 
short-run benefit of accommodation and this is what brings the reputation effect alive. 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1987, p. 545) emphasize that "it is the cost/benefit tradeoff, and not 
the firequency of play or the number of opponents per se, which is the key to understanding 
reputation effects". 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) indicate that it may seem firom the previous discussion 
that the weak incumbent favors the situation where the outcomes of its interaction in 
previous markets are made known to aU future entrants. To show that this is not always the 
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case they compare payoffs to the weak incumbent for two different informational 
structures: informational linkage and informational isolation. The game is one of 
informational linkage if each entrant observes actions in all previous stages. If each entrant 
observes only actions in its own contest then this is a game of informational isolation. Note 
that it is very easy to solve the game with informational isolation since its equilibrium is 
just N copies of a single stage game, where weak incumbent always accommodates and 
the weak entrant enters if p < 6/(6 + 1) (otherwise, it stays out). 
If the incumbent has sufficiently high initial reputation (p > bl(Jb + I)) then it will 
prefer the situation of informational isolation since in that case all weak entrants stay out 
and the weak incumbent nets a{\-q) from each market. Even if reputation is worth to 
invest in (case ii), the weak incumbent is worse off under the informational linkage since in 
that case the weak incumbent has to prove that reputation each period with probability of at 
least q which imposes a cost on the incumbent. 
The informational linkage is preferred when p < bl{b + \) and ^ < a/(a + I). In this 
case, all types of entrants enter under the informational isolation while some of the weak 
entrants are deterred when markets are informationally linked. 
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1.3. Reputation with a Single Long-run Player 
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) generalize and extend results obtained by Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) to the class of games where a single 
long-run player faces a sequence of myopic (short-run) opponents who play only once and 
each of them observes all previous play. We introduce some definitions and notation before 
we discuss their findings. Consider a game where the long-run player one faces an infinite 
sequence of different short-lived player two's. Each period player one and that period's 
player two simultaneously select actions from finite sets Ai and A 2 respectively. Each 
player's action is revealed at the end of the period. Let A, denote the space of mixed stage 
game actions corresponding to the action space A,. The unperturbed stage game is a map 
g : Ai xAi -* R^, which gives player /'s stage game payoff g, as a function of the realized 
actions. And let g(a) = ^(ai.ai) denote the expected payoff corresponding to the mixed 
action a. 
The unperturbed repeated game is the infinite sequential repetition of the unperturbed 
stage game played by the long-run player against different short-run opponents. In this 
game, the long-run player's objective function is the normalized discounted value of 
expected payoffs (1where 5 is the long-run player's discount factor 
(0 < 5 < I) and g[ is his stage game payoff in period r. Each period's player two 
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maximizes that period's payoff. 
The history h' in period i consists of the realized actions through period / - I, Let 
denote the set of possible histories of the game in period t. Ht = {Ai ^Az)'. Since all the 
past realized actions are observed, each player can condition his play on the entire past 
history of the game. A mixed strategy for player one is a sequence of maps 
a\  :  Hf - i  -*  A \ ,  and  a  mixed  s t ra tegy  fo r  pe r iod  t  player  two  i s  a  map  ;  / / t - i  An.  
Since period t short-run player cares only about that period's payoff, in any Nash 
equilibrium of this game each player two's choice of mixed strategy must be a best 
response to the anticipated strategy of the long-run player. That is, if we denote by 
B A\ i42 the correspondence that maps mixed stage game actions of player one to the 
best responses of player two, each period's play must lie in the graph of in any Nash 
equilibrium of the game. 
Fundenberg-Kreps-Maskin (1988) show that a version of folk theorem holds for class 
of games with a single long-run player. Let 
V\. - { v i  = g i ( a i , a 2 )  1  ( a u c t 2 )  ^ graph{B)} mdv], =max mingi(ai,a2) 
where minimum in the definition of vi is taken over all strategies az that are best 
response to some strategy of player one. That is, Vi is the set of feasible payoffs for player 
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one consistent with the short-run player playing a best response to some pure strategy of 
the long-run player and v\ is player one's minimax value in the game where player two is 
restricted to play a best response to some strategy of player one. Then, if player one is 
sufficiently patient (5 is close to 1) any payoff in that is larger than vi can be supported 
as a sequential equilibrium. 
One of the objectives of the paper is to show that this kind of "folk theorem" prediction 
is not robust against slight perturbations of the informational structure of the game. In the 
perturbed game the long-run player has private information about his payoff function. 
Player one's payoff is identified with his "type" co s fi, where Q has countably many 
elements. Let ii denote a probability measure on CI, which represents prior beliefs of short 
run players about long-run player's utility function. The set of actions available to each 
player in the stage game of the perturbed game, as well as the payoffs of the short-run 
player (corresponding to different action profiles), are the same as in the unperturbed 
game. But player one's period t payoff (01,02,0) may depend on his type. A mixed 
strategy for the long-run player in the perturbed game is a sequence of maps 
a[ : Ht-i xf2 /4i. A mixed strategy for the short-run player is the same as in the 
unperturbed game. 
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Let Oio denote the type of player one with payoff structure as in the unperturbed game. 
Type (Do is sometimes called "normal" or "sane". The question of interest is whether this 
type can benefit from the short-run player's uncertainty about his payoff structure as 
compared to the case when the short-run player has complete information. 
Stackelberg payoff of type tUo of the long-run player is defined as 
g\ (<Ho) =max min gi (a i, o)o)- The Stackelberg strategy of player one is the strategy 
"I ai<iB{a\) 
that attains this maximum. 
Assume that for each action ai  e  A i, there is a type co(a i )  for whom it is a strictly 
dominant strategy to play a i in each period of the perturbed game. 
Define gi(ct)o) =max min gi (a 1,02,0)0), which we call player one's commitment 
"1 az<=B{a{) 
payoff} The strategy that achieves this maximum a\ is called the commitment strategy. 
Type of player one for whom it is a strictly dominant strategy to play a\ in every period is 
commitment type. Denote to" = fl)(af). 
If "normal" type of player one could publicly precommit to a pure strategy then he 
would choose strategy a*. Then, the question is whether the long-run player can achieve 
his commitment payoff in the absence of the precommitment mechanism. 
To achieve his commitment payoff the long-run player must convince the short-run 
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player to play the best response to a\. And the short-run player bases his decision of choice 
of action on his assessment of likelihood of different actions of player one. The authors 
prove a lemma that describes the process of statistical inference by the short-run player if 
the long-run player chooses the same action in each period. 
We introduce some notation and definitions before we restate this lemma. Each 
(possibly mixed) strategy profile (0^,03) induces a probability distribution k over 
{A \ X Let h* denote the event that a[ = a\ for all i. Let n', be the probability 
attached by short-run players to the event that the commitment strategy is being played in 
period t after a history i.e. k* = Jt{a\ = afl/;'"'). Note that n* is a random variable 
since /i'"' is a random variable. For a given satisfying 0 < TT < 1, and for an infinite 
history /J let < IT) be the number of the random variables k* for which ret ^ Since 
an infinite history of the game is a random variable, so is n. 
Lemma L Let 0 < TT < I. Suppose = /z* > 0, and that (a'l.aj) are such that k 
(A'lw*) = L Then 
and for any infinite history h such that the truncated histories hi all have positive 
probability and such thataf is always played, K(co'\h') is nondecreasing in t. 
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The lemma asserts that if there is a positive prior probability of the commitment type 
and if the commitment strategy is always played, then there is a fixed finite upper bound on 
the number of periods in which player two will believe it is unlikely to be played. Note, that 
the lemma does not assert that player two eventually becomes convinced that he faces 
commitment type of player one. The lemma shows that the short-run players become 
convinced diat the long-run player will play as a commitment type. Fudenberg and Levine 
use this lemma to prove the main theorem of the paper which says that the long-run 
player's discounted average payoff in any Nash equilibrium will exceed the bound which 
converges to his commitment payoff as player one's discount factor converges to one. The 
theorem is robust against further perturbations of the game's information structure. That is 
if any other types of the long-run player are allowed, the assertion of the theorem holds. 
Also, the conclusions of the theorem hold if the game is repeated sufficiently many finite 
number of times. 
The theorem is powerful since it gives a tight lower bound for the long-run player's 
payoff and is in contrast with die message of "folk theorem". 
Note that the discussion above was devoted to a certain class of repeated games where 
each stage game is a simultaneous move game. The authors ask the question whether 
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reputation effects have power when the stage game is not simultaneous. They present an 
example of the game where long-run player does strictly worse than predicted by the 
results for the simultaneous move games. 
Example; In the stage game, the short-run player moves first and chooses whether to 
buy or not to buy fi-om the long-run player. If the short-run player chooses not to buy then 
the game ends and both players receive payoff of zero. If he buys, player one has to choose 
between high and low quality. If player one chooses high then both players receive payoff 
of one, while if player one chooses low, then player one's payoff is 3 and player two's 
payoff is - I. In this example player one would choose the strategy of always playing high if 
he could publicly commit to that strategy. The results for the simultaneous move stage 
game might suggest that in any Nash equilibrium of this game player one v^ll obtain a 
payoff arbitrarily close to one. To prove that this intuition is false the authors find a 
sequential equilibrium of the game where along the equilibrium path the short-run players 
never buy and hence player one's payoff is zero. 
In this example, a certain action (not buy) taken by the short-run player "hides" the 
action that the long-run player takes if purchase occurs. Hence, if the short-run player does 
not buy, the long-run player is deprived of the opportunity to play his commitment strategy 
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(producing high quality) and to convince the subsequent short-run players of his 
willingness to continue playing this action. Note that this problem is not present in the 
chain store game, since the action that "hides" the incumbent's strategy (stay out) 
corresponds to the commitment outcome. 
Thus, for general stage games it is not true that the long-run player can almost ensure 
the payoff he could obtain if he was able to publicly commit to any strategy. 
The authors offer two responses to this problem. The first is to examine perturbations 
of the game with the property that all information sets in the stage game are reached with 
positive probability. In this case, by playing commitment strategy in every period the long 
run player will eventually force the game to the commitment outcome. 
The second response is weakening the main theorem for the simultaneous move stage 
game. The authors consider the class of games where each stage game is a finite extensive 
game of perfect recall without moves by Nature. To capture the fact that some strategies of 
player two might "hide" actions of player one at certain information sets, die authors 
introduce the notion of observationally equivalent strategies. 
Definition; The set of strategies of player one 0(ai,a2) that are observationally 
equivalent to (ai,a2) is defined as 0(ai,a2) = {a[ eAi | (a'l.ai) leads to the same 
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terminal node as (ai.ao)}. 
In the example with choice of quality the strategies high and low are observationally 
equivalent given that player two does not purchase. 
[f the long-run player plays the same action a\ in eveiy period then player two will 
eventually believe that the long-run player will be choosing some strategy a\ from 
0{a\,a2) and hence will play a best response to some strategy with support in 0(ai,a2). 
This consideration leads to the following definition: for each a\, let 
= {02 1 a2 s for some a, with support in 0{ai,a2)}. That is, PF(ai) 
denotes the set of player two's pure strategy best responses to beliefs about player one's 
strategy that are consistent with the information revealed when that response is played. 
Let g\ =max min gi{ai,a2,o)o). Strategy of player one that achieves this 
maximum is denoted by at. Type of player one for whom it is a strictly dominant strategy 
to play af in every period is denoted by The authors show if there is a positive prior 
probability of type (o', then in any Nash equilibrium player one's average discounted 
payoff exceeds the bound that converges to g! as 5 tends to one. 
Fudenberg and Levine (1989) extend their main theorem to the case when the stage 
game is /i-player simultaneous move game. That is, in each period the long-run player 
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faces n - I short-run opponents. In any Nash equilibrium the strategies of« - I short-run 
players must form a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by fixing the strategy of the 
long-run player. The commitment payoff and action for player one can be defined with 
obvious modifications of the single short-run player case. The authors show that if there is 
a prior probability of the commitment type then in any Nash equilibrium the long-run 
player obtains at least as much as his commitment payoff for discount factors close to one. 
The case when players have a continuum of strategies in each period is also considered 
in the paper. In this case, the basic simultaneous move model is unchanged with two 
exceptions. First, Ai and Az are assumed to be compact metric spaces and the set of 
possible types of player one Q is an arbitrary measure space. The payoff maps 
g i  :  A i  xA2  X R  andg2  :  A i  xAz  R  l i re  assumed to  be  con t inuous  on^ i  xAz .  
Working with a continuum of strategies and arbitrary measure space of types gives rise 
to two technical complications. First, it is not the case any more that if the short-run player 
assigns a large probability weight to the commitment strategy, he must play a best 
response to it. Second, it is not sensible that the short-run player puts a positive probability 
on the commitment strategy. Instead the authors assume that the short-run player places a 
positive probability on all neighborhoods of the commitment strategy. The authors consider 
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types ci)o belonging to a positive probability set Qo, such that each type coo has a different 
commitment payoff and commitment strategy: 
The commitment strategy of player one a1{co„) is the limit of the sequence a"' such 
t h a t  m i n  g l i a l ' , a 2 , W o ) g l M .  
ajGiSCa^) 
The authors show that in any Nash equilibrium almost all types in Qo obtain more than 
a bound which converges to their respective commitment payoffs as discount factor 
approaches one. 
In Fudenberg and Levine (1989) the analysis is concentrated on the case where there is 
a positive prior of the pure-strategy commitment type. In general, the long-run player can 
obtain a higher payoff if he could publicly precommit to a mixed strategy. For instance, in 
the version of the chain-store game discussed in Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) the strategy 
that the long-run player would most like to precommit is where he fights entry with 
minimum probability that deters weak entrants from entering the market. 
Also, in many games of interest actions chosen by economic agents are observed with 
some noise. That is, die outcome of the stage game may not be a deterministic indicator of 
actions chosen. This situation might arise if the long-run player uses a mixed stage-game 
strategy, if there is a moral hazard, or if the stage game is a general extensive form game. 
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Fudenberg and Levine (1992) address these and other issues in their paper where they 
study reputation effects in repeated games where a single long-run player faces a sequence 
of short-run players but the long-run player's choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly 
observed. This paper improves on Fudenberg and Levine (1989) in several respects. The 
authors find both lower and upper bound on the long-run player's payoff. If the stage-game 
has simultaneous moves, if commitment types for every mixed strategy belong to the 
support of probability measure over possible types, and if the game is generic then both the 
upper and the lower bound converge to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff as the 
discount factor approaches one. This shows that reputation effects can have very strong 
implications for repeated games with imperfect information. The second improvement over 
their 1989 paper is that the authors consider the case where players' actions may be subject 
to moral hazard. Fudenberg and Levine (1992) show that imperfect observability does not 
change the basic reputation-effects intuition when the long-run player's actions are 
statistically identified. In particular, they prove that limits of upper and lower bounds are 
independent of amount of noise under statistical identification. 
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1.4. Reputation with Many Long-run Players 
The focus of our discussion in the previous subsection was on the class of games 
where a single long-run or patient player faces a sequence of short-run opponents who are 
uncertain about long-run player's payoffs. That discussion showed that presence of this 
kind of incomplete information allows a patient player to obtain at least a commitment 
payoff in any Nash equilibrium of repeated game. A long-run player can achieve a payoff 
corresponding to the strategy that he would most like to commit (a commitment strategy) 
by mimicking behavior of the commitment type. 
There are many economic situations, modeled as repealed games, where more than a 
single player is long-lived. For instance, the prisoners' dilemma game played by the same 
two players finitely or infinitely many times, two players involved in a bargaining process, 
etc. There are a number of differences that arise in the repeated game where a long-run 
player's opponent cares about future payoffs. As in the previous discussion we assume that 
player one is the player that might try to maintain a reputation for following some strategy 
and player two is his opponent. Recall that in the repeated game against myopic opponents 
the best possible commitment for the long-run player is the Stackelberg strategy, since the 
short-run opponent in each period plays the best response to that period's expected action. 
However, if player two is patient then he will not play the best response when he expects 
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that this course of action may lead to the punishment by player one. This drives a wedge 
between the highest payoff player one can obtain by publicly committing to a particular 
strategy (which, in general, will not be static) and the lowest payoff he receives in any 
Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. 
When player two is not myopic, the best player one can do by publicly committing to a 
strategy in general is not a static repetition of some action. In this case, player one might 
achieve more by committing to a history dependent strategy. For instance, consider 
repetition of the prisoners' dilemma game (Figure 1.3). Static Stackelberg strategy for this 
game is to defect with resulting payoff of zero. If player one faced a patient opponent and 
could publicly commit to a "tit-for-tat" strategy (play today the action that opponent played 
yesterday) then he would obviously be better off. Consider a case when there is a positive 
probability of a "tit-for-tat" type, that is, a type that starts with cooperation and in each 
period repeats the action chosen by opponent in the previous period. Suppose that normal 
type of player one (i.e., type of player one with payoffs as in Figure 1.3) tries to mimic a 
"tit-for-tat" type and starts with cooperation in period one. Suppose player two defects in 
some period t and continues defecting. Then normal type of player one will not have a 
chance to show that cooperative action of player two in some period will be followed by 
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cooperation in the next period. And hence, player one is unable to convince player two that 
he will be follov^ng a particular course of action for some contingency since it may never 
arise in equilibrium. The intuition of this example highlights the difficulty in maintaining a 
reputation for being a type that follows history dependent strategy. The problem comes 
from the q^equilibrium path behavior. Player one can convince his opponent that 
commitment strategy will be played on the equilibrium path. But it is impossible to 
demonstrate what would have been done along the off-equilibrium path. 
Cooperate 
Defect 
Figure 1.3. The prisoners' dilemma. 
The first paper that studies reputation models with two long-run opponents is Schmidt 
(1993). He considers a model similar to that of Fudenberg and Levine (1989). The only 
difference is that player one's opponent is a long-lived player who maximizes his 
discounted average payoff (with some discount factor ^2). The author shows that in any 
Cooperate Deject 
(2,2) (-1, 3) 
(3, -1) (0,0) 
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Nash equilibrium of the perturbed repeated game the normal type of player one can 
guarantee at least the payoff he would get from public precommitment to a static strategy 
that minimaxes player two, given that player one is sufficiently patient. This bound is good 
in some games (for example, the chain-store game), but does not impose any restrictions 
beyond those of individual rationality and feasibility in others (for example, the prisoners' 
dilemma). Schmidt identifies the class of games where this lower bound on equilibrium 
payoffs is the most player one could obtain by publicly committing to any strategy. These 
are games of conflicting interests in which the static strategy a player would most like to 
commit holds the opponent down to his minmax payoff. Note that in this class of games 
player one can not gain from the ability to commit to history dependent strategies since 
player two has to receive more than minmax payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Schmidt only considers commitment types that play pure strategies and indicates that all 
results of the paper can be extended to mixed strategies by using methods developed in 
Fudenberg and Levine (1992). The author shows that if the condition of conflicring 
interests does not hold then there is a perturbation of the game and a sequential equilibrium 
of this game such that player one's payoffs are bounded away from his commitment payoff 
in the limit as 51 approaches one. That is, conflicting interests is a necessary condition for 
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player one to obtain as much from any equilibrium of the perturbed as he would get from 
the strategy he would most like to commit. Even if the game is not of conflicting interests, 
findings of the paper allow one to restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes as compared to 
prediction of the Folk Theorem. Schmidt provides an example illustrating this point, which 
is presented in Figure 1.4. This is not a game of conflicting interests since commitment 
strategy of player one is U while strategy that minmaxes player two is D. Folk theorem for 
this example predicts that any point in the vertically shaded area of Figure 1.5 can be 
sustained as an equilibrium of the repeated game. Suppose player one mimics type that 
always plays D. Then he will eventually convince opponent that D will be played in the 
fiiture with high probability and player two will eventually play a best response against this 
action. If player one is sufficiently patient he can guarantee at least payoff of 2 in any Nash 
equilibrium of the perturbed game. Thus, results of the paper allow one to reduce the set of 
equilibrium outcomes to the double shaded area of Figure 1.5. 
U 
D 
Figure 1.4. Example of a game with non-conflicting interests. 
L M R 
(3,2) (0,1) (0,1) 
(0,-1) (0, -1) (2,0) 
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Figure 1.5. Vertically shaded area - the set of the Folk theorem predictions; 
Double shaded area - equilibrium payoffs that survive Schmidt's criterion. 
Schmidt shows that there is a fundamental difference between the games with a single 
long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents and games with many long-run 
players. To prove this point he presents a game where player one can be infinitely more 
patient than his opponent and shows that this game has an equilibrium which violates 
Fudenberg and Levine's (1989) lower bound for games with a single patient player. 
Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas (1996) obtain a lower bound on equilibrium payoffs that 
improves on that of Schmidt (1993). Their model closely follows Schmidt (1993). To 
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discuss their results we will need some formal definitions. 
Let M{a\) = {02 s Ai \ gi{d\,a2) > min maxg2y be the set of strategies of player 
two that yield at least as much as min maxg2 against d 1. And let 
a\ eargmax min gi{a\,ai). The corresponding commitment payoff is defined as 
at a2«=jV/(ai) 
gf = min gi(af,a2). The main result of the paper states that if there is a positive 
a;ejV/(aJ) 
probability of commitment type ca' of player one whose strictly dominant strategy is to 
play a, in each period and if player one is sufficiently patient then he can guarantee almost 
in any Nash equilibrium. The intuition of this result is the following. Normal type of 
player one can mimic type o' by playing a[ in each period. This will eventually convince 
player two that action af will be played in the fiature with high probability. If player does 
not play a best response to an expected action, that gets very close to a f as time 
progresses, then player two receives less than his minmax payoff in the continuation game. 
But this contradicts the fact that every player has to receive more than his miiunax payoff 
in any Nash equilibrium of the game. Hence, player two will eventually play a best 
response against a[ and player one will be able to guarantee at least g J if he is sufficiently 
patient. The authors also show that in any game with two possible types of player one, 
normal type and any type that follows a finitely complicated history dependent strategy 
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(finite automaton), there is a probability assignment over these types such that sufficiently 
patient player one gets an amount arbitrary close to gf in some equilibrium of the 
perturbed game. Thus, gf is tight in a sense that it is the highest lower bound on 
equilibrium payoffs that is robust against all possible informational perturbations. 
Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas (1996) consider the battle of the sexes game (Figure 1.6) 
to illustrate the usefulness of their results to restrict the set of equilibrium outcomes. If 
player one plays U with probability ^ and D with probability j then player two is held 
down to his minmax payoff of j. If there is a positive probability of player one type who 
every period plays strategy that minmaxes player two, then in any Nash equilibrium of the 
game sufficiently patient player one can guarantee at least 2-j (this set of equilibrium 
payoffs is depicted as the shaded area in Figure 1.7). Contrast this with prediction of the 
Folk Theorem that any outcome in the triangle ABC in Figure 1.7 can be supported as an 
equilibrium outcome of the repeated game. 
U 
D 
Figure 1.6. The battle of the sexes. 
L R 
(3,1) (0,0) 
(0,0) (1,3) 
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Figure 1.7. The set of equilibrium payoffs that survives Cripps et al. (1996) criterion. 
The results discussed so far in this subsection require player one to be infinitely more 
patient than player two. This assumption may be justified if one is modeling a situation 
where a single player one faces a large sequence of long-run player two's, who observe all 
previous actions and alternate their play so that the first player two moves in periods 
[,M+ U ", the second player two in periods 2,N + 2,..., etc. In this situation player one 
plays in more future periods than any particular player two and hence cares more about 
future payoffs. 
One justification for a player to become infinitely patient is that the lag between time 
periods gets smaller. If this interpretation of infinite patience is taken and if the same 
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physical players interact in each stage of the game, then it is the most plausible to assume 
that as one player becomes infinitely patient so does the other. The interesting question is 
whether reputation effects will still allow one to reduce the set of possible predictions if 
players are equally and infinitely patient. This issue is addressed in Cripps and Thomas 
(1995) who consider a general repeated simultaneous-move game between two long-run 
players that maximize Banach limits of average payoffs. As in other reputation models it is 
assumed that player two is uncertain about the type of player one and that player one may 
be a type who plays a particular pure or mixed action each period. Under the assumption 
on the presence of a particular player one type, the authors find a lower bound on 
equilibrium payoffs in any Nash equilibrium that is similar to the bound in Cripps, Schmidt 
and Thomas (1996). This bound is tight and is robust against further perturbations of the 
game. 
In the beginning of our discussion in this subsection we have indicated that player 
one's best possible commitment when the opponent cares about future payoffs is in general 
not a static Stackelberg strategy. A history dependent strategy that punishes and rewards 
player two under different contingencies might yield a higher payoff to player one. A 
difficulty in establishing a reputation for playing such a strategy is that these rewards and 
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punishments are to be carried out under contingencies that may never arise on the 
equilibrium path. And player two cannot be convinced that his opponent is using this kind 
of strategy if rewards and punishments are not occasionally demonstrated. En the models 
discussed in this subsection player one could not improve his payoff by mimicking finitely 
complicated history dependent strategy. One common assumption of these models is the 
perfect observability of players' actions. Celentani et al. (1996) consider a general repeated 
simultaneous-move game with two long-run players where player two's stage-game action 
is imperfectly observed. The authors assume that at the end of each period a stochastic 
public outcome is observed by the players, but not the actions chosen by them in the stage 
game. The support of possible public outcomes is independent of the actions chosen by 
player two. Under this assumption contingencies occasionally arise that will allow player 
one to demonstrate rewards and punishments. Celentani et al. (1996) investigate whether 
player one can establish a reputation for playing a history dependent strategy in this 
environment. Below we present some definitions and assumptions of Celentani et al. 
(1996) to discuss their findings. 
A behavior strategy has bounded recall if there exists a finite number M such that 
action in any period t depends entirely on the history between t -N and / - I. It is assumed 
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that there is a positive prior probability of each type of player one for whom it is a strictly 
dominant strategy to play some pure strategy of bounded recall. 
The authors also assume that distribution over possible outcomes is statistically 
identified by the stage-game strategy of player one. If this assumption is not satisfied then 
player two can play a stage-game strategy that will prevent him from learning certain 
strategy of player one. 
To ensure feasibility of rewards it is assumed that there is a pure strategy profile that 
yields player two a payoff greater than his minmax, 
Celentani et al. (1996) show that a patient player one gets at least as much in any Nash 
equilibrium of the game as payoff" from public precommitment in an arbitrary large finite 
truncation of the game. Note that the strategy that player one would most like to precommit 
in a finite truncation of the game does not have to be static. 
The authors also show that as 5^ -» I a patient player one receives the maximum 
feasible payoff that gives player two at least his pure strategy minmax payoff. 
The bound obtained in the paper is in general higher than that of Cripps, Schmidt and 
Thomas (1996) for the case of perfect observability. For example, in the prisoners' 
dilemma game of Figure 1.3 results of Cripps, Schmidt and Thomas (1996) give the same 
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prediction as the Folk Theorem: player one's payoff in any Nash equilibrium is bounded 
below by zero. While under incomplete observability and assumption that there is a 
positive prior probability of commitment types playing bounded recall strategies, a 
relatively more patient player one can achieve a payoff close to 2y . Similar inspection of 
the battle of the sexes game allows us to conclude that patient player one guarantee almost 
a payoff of 3 in any Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game. 
Aoyagi (1996) obtains results similar to those of Celentani et al. (1996). He considers a 
repeated game between two long-run players. Normal type of player one maximizes the 
time-average (note, that this reflects complete patience of player one): 
*/i(cri(cuo),o-2 I Ota) =liminf | cOo] , where <TI and o": 
r-Ko ' 
denote mixed strategies of players one and two respectively, cryicoo) is the mixed strategy 
of the normal type of player one, and is the expectation operator with respect to 
mixed strategies of players one and two. Player two maximizes normalized discounted 
average of stage payofiFs (with some discount factor ^). 
The sets of mixed strategies of a type of player one and of player two are denoted Z i 
and 1.2 respectively. Let Pi (cri,<5) = inf{vi (ai,a2 I (Oo) : o"2 e Sz is a best response 
to CTi} , be the worst payoff of player one if he can publicly commit to strategy Ci. Player 
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one's dynamic Stackelberg payoff relative to Z'l c Si is: Fi(2',,5) =sup v\ {o\,S). That 
(j|eZ| 
is, is player one's largest payoff if he could publicly commit to any strategy in 
2',. 
Let Ii denote the set of trigger strategies. A strategy CTI belongs to Si if and only if 
there exists some finite number n, a sequence of pure actions of player two {al, 
a sequence of mixed actions of player one {a\ , . . . ,a1}  such that CTI cyclically plays 
in that order as long as player two plays {^2^...,^2} that order, and CTI 
prescribes minmaxing player two forever after any deviation of player two from the 
prescribed cyclical behavior. 
Let Sf denote the subset of strategies of player one defined similarly as strategies in 
2i with the only difference that strategy of player one prescribes to return to the original 
cycle after a deviation in the event that player two has played his cycle some finite number 
of times. That is, player one forgives his opponent if he observes this event. It is assumed 
that there is a positive prior probability of types for whom it is a strictly dominant strategy 
to play some strategy from Sj". By mimicking one of these types player can guarantee at 
least a bound specified in the paper. 
Aoyagi finds a lower bound on player one's payoffs in any extensive-form trembling 
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hand perfect equilibrium. For the sake of completeness, we present a definition of that 
equilibrium concept in Appendix I. We give a version used by Aoyagi, which is slightly 
different from the common definition. 
Aoyagi shows that in any extensive-form trembling hand perfect equilibrium of the 
perturbed game player one's payoff is at least as high as which is equal to 
F'lCIi ,5) . He also proves that as the discount factor of player 2 tends to one 
approaches player one's maximum payoff in the individually rational set. Thus, if player 
two is sufficiently patient a completely patient player one can guarantee (in any extended 
form trembling hand perfect equilibrium) almost a payoff he would get fi-om optimal 
public precommitment. 
The reputation models that we have discussed up to this point in our review concerned 
only repeated games where a long-run player faces either a sequence of short-run 
opponents or a long-run opponent that can be equally or less patient. This class of games is 
a small subset of dynamic games. In general dynamic games some contingencies might 
arise that will effectively end die game for some players or the stage game played each 
period may not be static. 
Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996) investigate whether reputation effects allow one to 
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narrow the set of predictions for a certain class of dynamic games. The authors consider a 
repeated game between one large player and a continuum of identical small players. Each 
period (t = 1,2,...) all players randomize over finite sets of actions available to them 
(action sets of small players are identical). Each small player is characterized by his state, 
which is a private information of a small player except for the first period. The pi/b/ic 
history of the game at time t consists of the realizations of: i) actions chosen by a large 
player in the previous periods, ii) the probability measure over the Cartesian product of 
sets of possible states and actions for all previous periods." The private history of the 
game at time t for each small player consists of realizations of his strategy and states in 
previous periods, and the state in period t. At the beginning of each period all players 
observe the public history and each small player observes his private history. All players 
maximize their discounted average payoffs. A pure strategy for the large player is a 
sequence of maps from public histories to the set of available actions. A pure strategy for 
the small player is a sequence of maps from the Cartesian product of public and his private 
histories to the available actions. Behavior strategies are defined in the obvious fashion. 
The game is anonymous in the sense that a deviation by a set of small players of measure 
zero does not affect the public history of the game. For each small player, probability 
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measure over possible states in the next period depends on the action of the large player 
and the aggregate action of small players in the current period as well as small player's 
current action and state. The authors allow for the possibility that the fiinction describing 
the law of motion of the state variables may be stochastic. Note, that the game we have 
discussed so far can be thought of as an unperturbed game where large player's payoff 
function is known to all players. In the perturbed game there is a positive prior probability 
of the large player types that play restarting strategies: follow some strategy for a large 
finite number of periods T, in period T + 1 restart strategy, that is follow given the state in 
period r+ I, and so on. The authors prove that equilibrium payoff of a patient large player 
in any Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game is bounded below by the time average that 
the large player could obtain if he had an option of public precommitment in a large finite 
truncation of the game. 
To show how reputation effects affect the set of equilibrium outcomes for dynamic 
games, Celentani and Pesendorfer consider three models: the time consistency of the 
optimal government policy, the price setting behavior of the durable good monopolist and 
Matsuyama's (1990) trade liberalization game. We give a brief sketch of the first two 
models. 
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Example 1. The large player is a government and the small players are the households 
in the economy. The government chooses whether to use a tax on capital income or a 
distortionary labor tax to raise a certain amount of revenue. Based on the expected tax 
rates, the households choose the amount of capital investment (it is assumed that choice of 
investment is discrete). Given that the government is at least as patient as the households, 
the level of capital investment is suboptimal in the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the 
unperturbed game. In the perturbed game, the government's payoff is higher in any 
equilibrium than in the unperturbed game and the government can induce households to 
choose the optimal level of capital investment. 
Example 2. The large player is the durable goods monopolist and the small players are 
buyers. There are two types of buyers (low and high valuation). The monopolist's cost of 
production is equal to zero. Each period the monopolist sets a price. If the buyer has not 
acquired the good in any of the previous periods he chooses whether to buy or not. If the 
buyer buys in some period then he moves to "state" where he stays forever and receives 
discounted value of the difference between the price paid and his valuation. If buyers are 
sufficiently patient, then the monopolist's payoff in any subgame perfect equilibrium of the 
unperturbed game is equal to the value of the good to the low valuation consumer. While in 
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the perturbed game the monopoh'st can guarantee a payoff very close to the total consumer 
surplus. 
Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996) also investigate the case when the large and small 
players are equally patient. The lower bound on the equilibrium payofFs of the large player 
in any Nash equilibrium is the same as in the case when the large player is infinitely more 
patient than small players if the following reversibility condition holds. A function 
describing transition of the state variable satisfies reversibility condition if for every 
strategy of a small player and for every deviation from that strategy there exists a 
continuation strategy that allows to return to a path that is at least as good as the one 
corresponding to the original strategy. The reversibility condition is satisfied in the 
time-consistency model and the government's payoff is close to the best commitment in the 
large finite truncation of the game. This condition is violated in the durable good monopoly 
since once a buyer purchased a good he is locked in a permanent state. The authors find a 
sequential equilibrium of this game which yields the large player a payoff close to the value 
of the low valuation buyer. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE CHAIN-STORE GAME WITH MULTIPLE 
INCUMBENTS 
2.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have presented a literature review on reputation models. As 
we have indicated, this literature originated from trying to resolve Selten's chain-store 
paradox. In the chain-store game a multi-market monopolist faces a finite sequence of 
potential entrants. Each entrant observes the actions taken in the previous markets and 
chooses whether to enter the market monopolized by the incumbent firm. If there is an 
entry the monopolist has two options: to fight the entry or to accommodate. 
Accommodation is the best short-run response for the incumbent, given the entrant entered 
the market, whereas fighting is an optimal policy only if it deters some of the fiiture 
potential entrants. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the complete information 
game all entrants enter and the incumbent accommodates, given any history of the game. 
Kreps and Wilson (i982b) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982b) have shown that addition of 
a small amount of incomplete information is sufficient to overcome this paradoxical 
game-theoretic prediction. In particular, they show that if entrants assign even a small 
probability to the event that the incumbent is a "tough" type who prefers a price war to 
accommodation, then the incumbent will fight in early markets to preserve a reputation for 
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"toughness". Since in later periods the value of having a reputation for being "tough" is 
low (because there are fewer future competitors), this reputation breaks down in one of the 
last stages of the game. The higher the initial reputation for "toughness" the more of early 
entrants are deterred and, hence, the higher the payoff to the incumbent. 
One limitation of the chain-store game is that each of the markets with potential entry 
is monopolized by a single firm. While in some situations this might be a reasonable 
assumption, there are numerous examples when a market is comprised of multiple 
established firms (this may be due to the fact that monopolization is against the law). For 
instance, if we consider large retail stores and pick a random city in the USA, then it is 
very likely that one can find K-Mart in addition to a Wal-Mart store. 
Our paper extends the basic chain-store game to the multiple-incumbent case. We 
consider a hypothetical situation where two established firms operate retail stores in a finite 
number of geographic locations (markets). These chain-stores sell products diat are 
imperfect substitutes. Each of these markets is threatened by an entry of a different 
potential competitor. If the third store is opened then it will be selling an imperfect 
substitute wath the products offered by the two chain-stores. Potential entrants are faced in 
a sequence and outcomes in previous markets become known to all later players. 
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Following entry, each of the two chain-stores simultaneously and independently decides 
whether to fight the entry (for instance, a sharp price cutting) or to accommodate (share 
market peacefiilly with the new entrant). If a potential competitor decides to stay out, then 
the two chain-stores split market profits. The entrant prefers to open a store only if neither 
of the chain-stores fights. If the entrant enters, then in the short-run each chain-store strictly 
prefers to accommodate no matter what the other chain-store's action is. Fighting by even 
a single chain-store imposes short-run losses on both of them. In Section 2.2 we give a 
detailed description of the game where potential competitors are completely informed of 
the payoff structures of the two incumbent firms (the complete information game), and 
show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is for both incumbents to accommodate 
and for all entrants to enter given any history of the game. That is, none of the potential 
competitors is deterred fi:om entering. 
We also investigate whether the same behavior emerges if each of the incumbents may 
have an initial reputation for being a "tough" type that will fight entry in each market along 
any equilibrium path. In the model of Section 2.3 each of the incumbents (as well as 
entrants) is uncertain about its counterpart's type. That is, each incumbent is uncertain 
whether the other incumbent enjoys fighting. As one would expect, the presence of initial 
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reputation deters entry under some parameterization of the model. 
Our work is closely related to the entry deterrence literature.^ An extensive research in 
this area of industrial organization has started with the seminal contributions by Bain 
(1956), Modigliani (1958) and Sylos-Labini (1962). These early treatments of entry 
prevention were different variations of the limit-pricing model. The essential assumption of 
these models is that potential entrants believe tliat established firms will maintain the same 
price as the pre-entry level. Then, an incumbent or colluding incumbents may set such a 
low pre-entry price level that entry is discouraged. These models have received strong 
criticism. The incumbent firm, faced with the fact of entry, will find it in its own interest to 
raise the price above the pre-entry level. In other words a commitment of the incumbent 
firm to sustain the same price level is not credible.Spence (1977) and Dixit (1979,1980) 
suggested that the threat to meet entry by aggressive policy can be made credible by 
pre-entry accumulation of sunk capital, so that the fulfillment of the threat is ex post (after 
the entry) optimal. 
Other early examinations of entry prevention are Schmalensee (1978) and Eaton and 
Lipsey (1979). Both papers suggest that the incumbent or colluding incumbents may use 
product differentiation to preempt entry by filling up the product space. 
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Most of the early literature has concentrated on the case where a single incumbent or a 
group of colluding incumbents face a single entrant. However, many industries are 
characterized by more than a single established firm. Also, a number of firms enter 
industries during their evolution (Bemheim (1984)). A number of authors have 
investigated models with several incumbents and/or sequential entry. Our paper falls into 
this category but it differs fi"om most treatments in sequential entry literature in that 
potential competitors enter different markets in our analysis. 
Bemheim (1984) considers a highly stylized model of sequential entiy where each 
incumbent has access to a wasteful and nondurable^ entry deterrence technology. The 
author shows that standard government policies aimed at decreasing industry concentration 
can have an opposite effect under some scenarios. 
Gilbert and Vives (1986) analyze a model where an established oligopoly in a 
homogeneous good market faces a potential entrant that has to pay a fixed cost to enter. In 
the first stage of their game the incumbent firms simultaneously and independently choose 
their output levels. In the second stage the entrant decides whether to enter, and if it enters 
how much to produce. That is, the entrant acts as a Stackelberg follower in case of entry. 
Hence, entry is deterred if total output produced in the first stage exceeds a certain 
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threshold level. Entry prevention is a public good in this setting, since if one of the 
incumbents produces sufficient output to deter entry, the other incumbents benefit from 
entry deterrence. In our model entry deterrence is also a public good since any of the 
incumbents profits if its counterpart fights to preserve reputation for "toughness" and if 
that reputation deters entrants in later markets. Contributing to entry deterrence is costly in 
our analysis and, hence, each of the established firms wants to free ride on the entry 
preventing activities of the other incumbent. In Gilbert and Vives' model entry prevention 
is not necessarily costly. If equilibrium prescribes entry to be deterred, then each 
incumbent would like to contribute as much as possible to entry prevention (since 
additional output earns revenues). The authors show that underinvestment in entry 
deterrence never occurs in the equilibrium. Moreover, for some levels of entry fee (fixed 
cost) overinvestment may take place in a sense that the incumbents profits would be higher 
if they could collude and allow entry. This result is not very surprising since the 
incumbents would have a tendency to overproduce even in the absence of potential entrant. 
Eaton and Ware (1987) consider an entry deterrence model with sequential capacity 
commitments where incumbent firms act noncooperatively. The authors find that the free 
rider problem does not arise in their analysis. McLean and Riordan (1989) analyze a model 
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similar in nature to Eaton and Ware's. In their model, firms enter sequentially and make 
one of the two irreversible technology choices in case of entry. One of the two technologies 
is the "deterring" technology in the sense that a firm will choose it only to deter entry. The 
other technology is the "normal" technology; given the other firms' entry/technology 
decisions normal technology is always more profitable for a firm.^ After all firms have 
made their entry/technology decisions, firms that have entered share industry profits. Profit 
of each firm is a fimction of its technology choice, the number of firms that have chosen the 
normal technology and the number of firms that have chosen the deterring technology. 
McLean and Riordan find that under some scenarios collusion between early entrants to 
deter future rivals would be mutually beneficial, but does not occur in a non-cooperative 
equilibrium. That is, underinvestment in entry deterrence is a distinct possibility. 
Waldman (1987, 1991) provides an intuitive explanation why there is no evidence of 
the firee rider problem in Bemheim's, Gilbert and Vives' and Eaton and Ware's models, 
while in McLean and Riordand's analysis underinvestment can be the unique equilibrium. 
Waldman (1991) points out that a distinct feature of Bemheim's and Gilbert and Vives' 
analysis is that the total return to investing in entry deterrence occurs at a single point. That 
is, there is a single critical level of investment such that an epsilon increase in entry 
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deterrence activity induces the probability of entry to change from zero to one. Waldman 
(1987) reexamines Bemheim's and Gilbert and Vives' models by adding to them an 
uncertainty on the incumbents' behalf about the critical level of entry preventing 
technology (which eliminates the single critical level of investment). He finds that 
introduction of uncertainty into Bemheim's model causes the free rider problem to become 
an important factor in a sense that there is a strong tendency for the oligopoly to 
underinvest in entry deterrence, while addition of uncertainty to Gilbert and Vives' model 
makes overinvestment in entry prevention even more likely. In his 1991 paper, Waldman 
shows that removing the assumption of nondurability of entry deterrence investment from 
Bemheim's model may result in underinvestment. 
Church and Ware (1996)'' consider a model of sequential entry into an industry with 
U-shaped average cost curve. They completely characterize the equilibrium market 
structure for linear demand and quadratic costs. In their analysis, a firm may deter entry of 
future rivals by producing "large" output. This is costly since the marginal cost is 
increasing. But it also confers a strategic advantage over future entrants, since a firm gets a 
larger share of the market by producing "large" output. Depending on which effect 
dominates, a firm will deter entry of future competitors or delegate that task to later 
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entrants. 
In addition to the "first-mover" and absolute cost advantages, the incumbent firms may 
have an informational advantage over potential entrants. This asymmetry of information 
may result fi'om the fact that the incumbents inhabited the industry for a long enough time 
to learn specific information on market demand and industry costs. One of the first 
treatments of informational asymmetiy" between incumbents and entrants is Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982a). They consider a model where the incumbent is better informed about its 
cost function than the potential entrant. In their model the incumbent charges a low 
pre-entry price to signal that its marginal cost is low, and hence die entrant will be in a 
strategically unfavorable position upon entry. Bagwell (1985) considers a model where the 
incumbent can use wasteful advertising to convey to the entrant diat its cost is high. He 
finds that advertising is not used in the equilibrium. Thus, in these models of asymmetric 
information pre-entry action of an incumbent is a signal about its payoff function. This is 
also true of our model where an incumbent or incumbents may fight in early markets to 
signal to future competitors that fighting yields a higher payoff dian accommodation. 
Harrington (1987) extends and modifies the analysis of Milgrom and Roberts (1982a) 
for the case when the industry is initially comprised of multiple incumbents. In 
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Harrington's model, the incumbent firms are better informed about the industry-specific 
cost parameter than potential entrants. In the pre-entry period the incumbent firms 
simultaneously and independently choose their outputs. Potential entrants observe the first 
(pre-entry) period price. High price in the first period signals to potential entrants that this 
is a high cost industry and, hence, may discourage entry (in contrast to low price in 
Milgrom and Roberts' model). Based on their updated beliefs about the common (to both 
incumbents and entrants) cost fionction, the entrants make their entry decision in die second 
period. In case of entry, potential entrant incurs an entry fee and leams industry cost 
fianction. The third period is a quantity competition between incumbent firms and new 
entrants (if any). Harrington finds diat the presence of asymmetric information allows 
noncolluding incumbents to deter entry that would have occurred under symmetric 
information. He also shows that an increase in the potential competition (number of 
prospective entrants) may result in a higher pre-entry price and welfare losses. The model 
in our paper and Harrington's analysis have a critical difference in the assumption on die 
information structure of the game. In Harrington's model the incumbents are perfectly 
informed about each other while in our paper each incumbent possesses information not 
known to all odier players. 
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In our model we investigate whether both, one or none of the chain-stores would be 
willing to fight entry to preserve reputation for "toughness" and whether entry is 
successfiilly deterred. As we show in Section 2.3 this crucially depends on the absolute as 
well as relative initial reputations of the two incumbents. This reputation has value only if 
some of the future entrants are deterred. Note that it has value to both chain-stores. That is, 
even if only one of the chain-stores fights to maintain its reputation, the other chain-store 
may benefit fi-om that reputation. And each chain-store prefers the other one to fight if that 
prevents entiy in some of the future periods. One of the most interesting findings of the 
paper is that an increase in reputation for "toughness" can have a negative value. That is, 
over some range of initial reputations a weak incumbent's payoff is a decreasing function 
of its reputation. This is in sharp contrast with Kreps and Wilson's and Milgrom and 
Roberts' models where higher reputation deters more entrants and, hence, is always 
beneficial. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we give a detailed 
description of the complete information version of our game. Section 2.3 contains an 
analysis of the finitely repeated incomplete information game. We give a complete 
characterization of the solution of the game with two periods and identify potential pitfalls 
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in trying to solve the game with more than two periods. We also find the lower bound on a 
sufficiently patient incumbent's payoff in the infinitely repeated version of the game. This 
bound is larger than the lowest payoff predicted by the Folk theorem. In Section 2.4 we 
conclude and outline some extensions and generalizations of our model. Some of the 
formal proofs are relegated to Appendix H. 
2.2. The Complete [nformation Game 
In our model we consider a hypothetical situation where two chain-stores have 
operations in a finite number N of markets (numbered fi'om 1 to N), each with a different 
geographic location. These chain-stores, called incumbents S and T, sell products that are 
imperfect substitutes. In each of the N markets there is a single potential competitor that 
can open a third store, that will be selling an imperfect (but close) substitute with the 
products offered by the two chain-stores. The potential competitor in each location is a 
different firm. A competitor in location i = l,...,Nis called entrant /. If an entrant decides 
to open a store, then each of the two chain-stores simultaneously and independently 
decides whether to fight or to accommodate the entry. Fighting may reflect a situation 
where an incumbent meets entry by sharp price cutting, heavy advertising campaign or any 
other response having such a negative effect on the entrant's profits that staying out would 
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be preferred to entry. An accommodating incumbent is willing to share the market 
peacefully with the new entrant. If a potential competitor decides to stay out, then the two 
chain-stores enjoy their respective shares of market profits. The extensive game form for 
the case when there is a single potential entrant is presented in Figure 2.1. The first 
element in the triplet at a terminal node is the payoff to incumbent S, second is the payoff 
to incumbent T and third is the entrant's payoff. 
Entrant 
enter 
accomodate fight stay out 
.accomodate accomodate 
fight 
-X 
-a 
-a 
-c 
-c 
Figure 2.1. Single stage of the complete information game. 
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Now we give a detailed description of payoffs to die players in the game of Figure 2.1. 
If the entrant chooses to stay out then this effectively ends die game and both incumbents 
receive a payoff of 1, while the entrant receives a payoff of 0. The entrant prefers to open a 
store only if neither of the chain-stores fights; .r > 0 and y > 0. That is, if the entrant is 
certain that at least one of the incumbents will fight then it will stay out. The payoff of the 
entrant is lower in the case when both chain-stores fight as compared to the case when only 
one takes aggressive action: x > y. It is also assumed diaty > I and 2y + 1 > x If at least 
one of the incumbents fights following entry then both incumbents receive a payoff lower 
tiian in the case when both accommodate: a > 0, b > 0 and c > 0. Tlius, even in a 
situation when only one of the incumbents fights both are worse off compared with the 
case of peacefiil response by both incumbents. If the entrant enters, then in the short-run 
each chain-store strictly prefers to accommodate no matter what the other chain-store's 
action is: a> b > c. That is, following entry, accommodation is a strictly dominant 
strategy for both incumbents. Thus, entry is followed by accommodation and, hence, yields 
a payoff of I to the entrant. While the entrant receives 0 if it stays out; and, hence, it will 
enter the market. Thus, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with a 
single rival, the entrant enters and both incumbents accommodate. 
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Now suppose that the game of Figure 2.1 is played by the same pair of incumbents 
against a sequence of N different entrants. We index time backwards by assuming that 
incumbents S and T play first entrant A/' (period or stage N), then entrant M - 1 (period or 
stage N-I), and so on. Each entrant observes the actions taken by the participants in all of 
the previous markets and makes its decision about the entry. The incumbents' total payoffs 
are the sums (undiscounted) of their respective payoffs in the M stages of the game. 
Application of backwards induction argument to this game yields a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium: all entrants enter and both incumbents accommodate for every history 
of the game. The intuition behind this result is similar to die one of die perfect information 
chain-store game: each entrant / correctly foresees diat die actions of the chain-stores in 
market i do not affect choices made in later markets (if any) and, hence, anticipates that 
both chain-stores will accommodate if entry occurs (since accommodation is a short-run 
best response). That is, the N' markets populated by die two chain-stores are essentially 
independent. 
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2.3. The Incomplete [nformation Game 
2.3.1. Description of the Game 
In the previous section we have analyzed a repeated version of the game depicted in 
Figure 2.1. One would expect that at least one of the incumbents would fight in early 
markets to scare fiature entrants that their entry would be met by aggressive response. But 
we have shown that fighting never arises as a (subgame perfect) equilibrium behavior. As 
one suspects, this result is driven by the assumption of complete information. In this 
section we present a model where entrants initially assign some positive probability p, to 
the event that incumbent i = S,T prefers fighting to accommodation. That is, entrants are 
uncertain about incumbents' payoffs and allow for the possibility that entry will be met by 
aggressive response (possibly by both established firms). 
Our formal model is a game with A'^ + 2 players: incumbents S and T and N entrants. 
Incumbents S and T play the game form of Figure 2.1 against a sequence of M entrants. All 
later entrants are perfectly informed of die actions chosen in die previous stages of the 
game. The entrants assess some initial positive probability p, that incumbent / = 5, Thas a 
payoff structure such that fighting is a short-run best response for incumbent i. That is, it is 
assumed diat incumbent i = S,T can be one of two types: "tough" with probability p, (with 
payoffs such that it will fight in every market along the equilibrium path) and "weak" with 
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probability (1 -p,) (with payoffs as in Figure 2.1). Each incumbent knows its payoffs but 
is uncertain about the payoffs to the other incumbent. We assume that incumbent i = S, T 
and the entrants assess the same initial probability that incumbent j ^ i prefers to fight in 
each stage of the game. 
Each entrant can also be of two types. "Tough" entrants have a payoff structure such 
that they prefer to enter regardless of the incumbents' strategies and "weak" entrants have 
payoffs depicted in Figure 2.1. Each entrant is tough with probability q. We assume that all 
players' types are independent random variables. It is also assumed that I -q-b > a-c. 
We introduce some useful notation before solving for the equilibrium of the multi-stage 
game of imperfect information. Let /?f denote the probability assessed by the players in the 
beginning of stage k that incumbent i = S,T is tough. For each k= I, pf is a fianction 
of the entire history of the game (actions taken by the players) up to and not including stage 
k. By our assumption, pf = Pi-
The equilibrium concept that we use to solve our model is a slightly stronger version of 
Kreps and Wilson's (1982a) sequential equilibrium in that we impose additional 
restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs. In particular, we require that the assessment be 
"sensible" in a sense that accommodation by any incumbent is seen as a sure sign of 
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weakness. 
Before solving for our game, note that in any "sensible" sequential equilibrium tough 
entrants always enter and tough incumbents fight for any history of the game. Hence, in the 
following discussion we concentrate on the equilibrium strategies of weak players. For this 
reason, we frequently drop the adjective "weak" when it does not give rise to confusion. 
2.3.2. One-period Game 
[n this subsection we consider the case when the two incumbent firms face a single 
entrant, that is the game form of Figure 2.1 is played only once. Note, that in any sequential 
equilibrium of this game both weak incumbents accommodate if entry occurs. There are no 
future potential competitors, and hence weak incumbents do not have any incentive to 
preserve reputation for "toughness" (since maintaining this reputation is costly in the short 
run). Thus, to solve for the sequential equilibrium we have to consider the weak entrant's 
choice between its two actions. The expected utility of the weak entrant if it enters is equal 
to 
(1)^MiCenter) = PsPK-^) +pK^ -PrK-y) -Ps)(-y) + (1 -Ps)(l -Pr) • I-
And weak entrant nets a payoff of zero if it stays out: 
(2) Eli I (stay out) = 0. 
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Hence, the entrant strictly prefers to enter if and only if pair (p^, p\) lies inside the 
shaded area V of Figure 2.2 except for the prior probabilities that belong to the curve L 
connecting points (0, ^ ) and (-j-^7^,0)- And weak entrant is indifferent between its 
two actions if (p^, Pr) belongs to L. Thus, weak entrant enters if initial reputations of both 
incumbents are sufficiently low, and it stays out otherwise. 
Figure 2.2. The set of initial reputations for which weak entrant enters. 
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2.3.3. Two-period Game 
In the previous subsection we have shown that, when the two incumbents populate 
only one market, neither of the weak incumbents has an incentive to meet entry by 
aggressive response. This is the case since fighting is costly in the short-run and there is no 
return to preserving reputation for toughness. When two established firms face more than a 
single potential entrant, weak incumbents may benefit fi"om pretending to be tough. 
Reputation of an incumbent is sustained until a later period only if that incumbent fought in 
all the previous markets. That is, a weak incumbent must incur a cost to maintain its 
reputation which has a value to that incumbent only if some of the fiature entrants are 
deterred. Note that if one of the weak incumbents chooses to fight in early markets to 
preserve its reputation and this deters some of the later entrants, then the other weak 
incumbent benefits firom reputation maintenance of its counterpart. In other words, 
reputation of an incumbent can have a public good property in that provision of that 
reputation (its maintenance) benefits both weak incumbents. And since provision of 
reputation is achieved through costly fighting each of the weak incumbents has an incentive 
to fi"ee ride on the entry preventing activities of the other weak incumbent. Thus, in our 
model weak incumbents have both conflicting and common interests. Their common 
interest is deterrence of potential entrants, while the conflicting interest is that each of the 
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weak incumbents is reluctant to contribute to the "common interest". 
To see which incentives of weak incumbents will dominate play of the game, we fully 
characterize equilibria of the sequential game with two periods. The equilibrium behavior 
of the players depends, among other things, on the initial reputations of weak incumbents. 
So, we present assessments that satisfy requirements of a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
over a relevant range of prior probabilities (Ps,Pt)- complete characterization of 
equilibrium assessments and the proofs that conditions on initial reputations are necessary 
and sufficient for the corresponding assessment to be a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
are relegated to Appendix II. Note that for some ranges of priors there is a multiplicity of 
equilibria. Discussion of these ranges is also postponed to Appendix H. 
Before presenting equilibrium assessments we list properties possessed by all 
equilibria. Recall that both weak incumbents accommodate in period I in any "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium. And tough incumbents fight in every market. Also, if there is no 
entry in period 2 then weak entrant I enters only if initial reputations lie inside area V and it 
stays out otherwise. Hence, when describing equilibrium strategy of weak entrant 1 we 
characterize its behavior at information sets following entry in period 2. If initial 
reputations lie outside area Fthen weak entrant 2 will stay out, otherwise its strategy will 
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depend on the actions of weak incumbents in period 2. 
First, we consider a situation when both incumbents have a "sufficiently" high initial 
reputation; prior probabilities pj and pf are both strictly larger than - T^he 
range of initial reputations satisfying these conditions is depicted as the shaded area in 
Figure 2.3. In this case the unique sequential equilibrium prescribes accommodation for 
both weak incumbents in period 2 (Equilibrium I in Appendix II). The intuition behind this 
equilibrium is the following. When both incumbents have a sufficiently high initial 
reputation for toughness then each weak incumbent is reluctant to fight for two reasons: i) 
incumbent / = 5", F has a high prior that the other incumbent is tough and, hence, that entry 
into market 2 will be fought with high probability. And this will be seen as a sure 
indication of toughness by entrant 1 given the strategy of weak incumbent j * /. Hence, 
incumbent / places a high probability on the event that weak entrant I will be deterred; ii) if 
weak incumbent / fights then it incurs additional cost (a - c) in the event when incumbent 
j * / is tough, which has a high prior probability. Thus, in the event when both incumbents 
are weak and entrant 2 is tough, which occurs with probability equal to 
(1 -/7|) • (1 -pf) • q, entry of weak entrant 1 is not deterred and ex post (after the entry 
was accommodated) weak incumbents regret that none of them has fought. 
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l+y l-q-b+a-c 
Figure 2.3. Both weak incumbents accommodate in period 2. 
When initial reputations belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.4 both weak incumbents 
fight in a "sensible" sequential equilibrium (Equilibrium II in Appendix H). The intuition 
behind this equihbrium is the following. If only one weak incumbent fights in period 2 then 
this does not deter weak entrant in market 1, since both pi and pf are less than ——. 
While if both weak incumbents meet entry in market 2 by aggressive response, then weak 
entrant I will stay out (since (p^.pf) = (PS>PT) lies outside area in this case). Since 
potential benefit of fighting outweighs its costs, both incumbents have an incentive to fight. 
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Roughly speaking, union of weak incumbents' reputations is sufficient to scare the fiiture 
weak entrant while individual reputations are not. 
When one of the incumbents has a "sufficiently" high initial reputation (strictly larger 
than -|"~y) and the other a "sufficiently" low one (strictly smaller than 
then in a "sensible" sequential equilibrium the incumbent with high reputation fights and 
the other incumbent accommodates. 
1 - -
l+y 
l+y 
Figure 2.4. Both weak incumbents fight in period 2. 
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In this discussion, we consider only the case when incumbent T is the one with high 
initial reputation (Equilibrium HI): pf > ^ndpi < (shaded area 
in Figure 2.5). The case when incumbent ^ has a high reputation is completely symmetric 
in the sense that description of equilibrium becomes the same as that of Equilibrium HI by 
switching subscripts S and T. In equilibrium HI weak incumbent S free rides on the 
reputation of incumbent T that fights in period 2 irrespective of its type. Maintaining a 
reputation is a worthy investment for weak incumbent T for two reasons. First, it 
necessarily deters entry of weak entrant 1. And second, incumbent S is tough with 
relatively "small" probability and, hence, there is a small chance that entry will be deterred 
by actions of incumbent S. It is clear that weak incumbent S does not have any incentive to 
deviate from its strategy since incumbent Ts actions alone are sufficient to deter entry in 
the last period. 
So far we have presented equilibria diat have both incumbents play pure actions in 
period 2. There also exist equilibria where one or both of the weak incumbents mix over 
tlieir actions in period 2. We divide our discussion of these equilibria into two parts. First, 
we present equilibria that correspond to ranges of initial reputations outside area V of 
Figure 2.2. Then, we discuss equilibrium behavior for initial reputations inside area V. 
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Figure 2.5. Weak incumbent S accommodates and weak incumbent T fights. 
For prior probabilities (Ps,Pt) that belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.6, there is a 
"sensible" sequential equilibrium where in period 2 weak incumbent S mixes between its 
two actions and weak incumbent T accommodates with probability one (Equilibrium V in 
Appendix H). Note that if initial reputations belong to the range symmetric (along the 45° 
line) to the shaded area of Figure 2.6, then there exists an equilibrium symmetric to 
Equilibrium V. In Equilibrium V weak entrant I stays out if incumbent T fought in period 
2 and mixes between "enter" and "stay out" if entry was fought by incumbent S and 
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accommodated by incumbent T. For weak entrant I to be willing to mix, the probability of 
fighting by weak incumbent S has to be chosen appropriately. In tum, randomization by 
weak entrant 1 is required to ensure indifference of weak incumbent S between "fight" and 
"accommodate". 
l+y 
l+y 
Figure 2.6. Weak incumbent S mixes and weak incumbent T accommodates. 
If prior probabilities (Ps>Pt) belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.7 
(t \ r ^ Ps.pf —r)> niixing by botii weak 
^  ( a - c + 1 - q f - 6 ) ( l + 3 ; )  a - c + \ - q - b "  ^  ^  
incumbents in period 2 is a part of a "sensible" sequential equilibrium (Equilibrium Vn in 
Appendix H). Randomizations in this equilibrium are chosen to ensure indifference of 
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weak incumbents between their two actions in period 2. Weak entrant Ts strategy in this 
equilibrium prescribes to stay out if at least one of the incumbents fought entry in period 2. 
Now we consider a situation when initial reputations belong to area Vof Figure 2.2. In 
this case it cannot be an equilibrium for both weak incumbents to fight in market 2. 
Suppose that equilibrium strategy prescribes for both weak incumbents to fight with 
probability one. Given these strategies, Bayesian updating yields posterior beliefs equal to 
the priors. Thus, the posterior beliefs lie inside area Vand, hence, entry of weak entrant I is 
not deterred. Since fighting is costly in the short-run, both weak incumbents have an 
incentive to accommodate given weak entrant I's strategy. 
l-q-h 
1-q-b 
0 k 1 
1+y l-(j-b+a-c 
(l-q-b+arc)(l+y) 
Figure 2.7. Both weak incumbents mix. 
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Neither can it be an equilibrium for both weak incumbents to accommodate with 
probability one in period 2. For if weak incumbents were using these strategies then 
fighting in period 2 is perceived as a sure indication of "toughness" and, hence, deters 
weak entrant I. We will show that weak incumbent S (as well as weak incumbent 7) can 
gain by deviating from its strategy and choosing to fight in period 2. Weak incumbent S, 
contemplating this deviation, recognizes that fighting will deter entry of weak entrant 1 
with probability one, while if weak incumbent S were to accommodate then it would 
expect entry to be deterred with probability pf (incumbent Ts initial reputation). Thus, the 
gain from deviation due to entry deterrence is equal to (I -pf)(l - q). On the other hand, 
fighting imposes additional costs on incumbent S. Relative to accommodation, the increase 
in fighting costs is equal to pf(a - c) + (1 - p})b. Since initial reputation of incumbent T is 
relatively small the gain from deviation outweighs the additional fighting costs and, hence, 
weak incumbent ^s strategy of accommodation in period 2 is not optimal. 
It is also easy to show that it is not an equilibrium for one of the weak incumbents to 
fight in period 2 and for the other one to accommodate. Without loss of generality suppose 
that weak incumbent S fights and weak incumbent T accommodates in period 2. Given 
these strategies, weak entrant 1 stays out only if it observes that incumbent T fought in 
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period 2 (reputation of incumbent S is not sufficient to deter entry in period I). That is, 
weak entrant I's strategy does not depend on the action of incumbent S in market 2. And, 
hence, weak incumbent S would prefer to accommodate in period 2. 
Thus, we have shown that if initial reputations belong to area V then it cannot be an 
equilibrium for both weak incumbents to play pure actions in period 2. That is, at least one 
of them should mix between its two actions. And a weak incumbent has to be indifferent 
between "fight" and "accommodate" to be willing to mix between these two actions. This, 
in turn, requires that weak entrant 1 mixes at some of its four information sets. 
There are four possibilities for qualitatively different equilibiria (Equilibria VIII, DC, X 
and XI in Appendix D) when initial reputations belong to area K Which one of these 
equilibria ensues depends on initial reputations of the two incumbents. In Appendix II we 
provide a necessary conditions on prior probabilities for each particular assessment to be 
an equilibrium (note that over some ranges of initial reputations there is a multiplicity of 
equilibria). All four equilibria have a common feature in that weak entrant I enters if there 
was no entry in period 2 since the posteriors are equal to the priors in this case and, hence, 
lie inside area F. 
Equilibria Vin and DC are symmetric (in the sense defined in the beginning of this 
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subsection). In these equilibria one of the weak incumbents mixes and the other fights with 
probability one in period 2. The range of intial reputations for which equilibrium VTEI is 
sequential is depicted in Figure 2.8. Weak entrant 1 enters if at least one of the incumbents 
accommodated in period 2, and mixes between "enter" and "stay out" if entry was fought 
by both incumbents. Since one of the weak incumbents fights with probability one in 
period 2 and tough incumbents always fight, weak entrant 2 is certain that one of the 
incumbents will fight irrespective of its type and, hence, does not enter. 
In equilibrium X both weak incumbents mix between their actions in period 2. Weak 
entrant 1 enters if at least one of the incumbents accommodated in period 2, and mixes if 
both established firms fought. 
Equilibrium XI is similar to equilibrium X in that both weak incumbents mix in period 
2 (the range of initial reputations is depicted in Figure 2.9). The qualitative difference 
between the two is that in equilibrium XI weak entrant I stays out at the information set 
following fight by both incumbents, enters if both incumbents accommodated and mixes if 
one incumbent fought and the other accommodated. Weak entrant 2's strategy in Equilibria 
X and XI depends on initial reputations of weak incumbents. In Equilibrium XI it enters 
only if initial reputations belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.10. 
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1  +  
1+y 
i+y 
Figure 2.8. Weak incumbent S mixes and weak incumbent T fights. 
1 - -
Figure 2.9. Both weak incumbents mix in period 2; 
Weak entrant I mixes if exactly one incumbent fought in period 
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Figure 2.10. Weak entrant 2 enters if (PS,PT) belongs to the shaded region. 
2.3.4. Value of Reputation in a Two-Period Game 
In the incomplete information chain-store game the weak incumbent always benefits 
from having a high reputation for toughness. This is the case because a high reputation 
deters more entrants. Our next proposition shows that this is not always true when there is 
more than a single player that may try to establish and/or maintain a reputation. 
Proposition: a) If initial reputation of incumbent / satisfies p~ > ^ , then weak 
incumbent f s  ( j  * /) expected equilibrium payoff is a globally decreasing function of its 
reputation; 
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b) If initial reputation of incumbent / satisfies p; > then weak 
incumbent^'s (/ ^ /) expected equilibrium payoff is a monotonically decreasing function of 
its reputation. 
Proof of this proposition is a direct corollary of our derivations of equilibrium payoffs 
in Appendix II. In Figures 2.11 and 2.12 we graphed equilibrium payoff of weak 
incumbent 5 as a function of its reputation. 
Figure 2.11 reflects a situation when incumbent Ts initial reputation satisfies 
p f  >  — — I  ~  ^  ~  ^ I n  t h i s  c a s e  t h e  u n i q u e  s e q u e n t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  " s u f f i c i e n t l y "  
low values of incumbent S's initial reputation prescribes fighting 
for weak incumbent T and accommodation for weak incumbent S in period 2 (Equilibrium 
HI in Appendix U). And if initial reputation pj > then both weak 
incumbents accommodate (Equilibrium I in the Appendix H) In the unique sequential 
equilibrium. For a fixed initial reputation of incumbent T, weak incumbent S's payoff in 
Equilibrium I is strictly smaller than in Equilibrium HI (see Appendix H for equilibrium 
payoff expressions). Thus, over this range of incumbent Ts initial reputation weak 
incumbent ^^s equilibrium payoff is a monotonically (and, hence, globally) decreasing 
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function of its reputation. 
In Figure 2.12 we depict weak incumbent S's equilibrium payoff as a function of its 
reputation for the case when Ot e ^^—r—-—r)- Note that under this 
condition there might be a multiplicity of equilibria for some values of initial reputation of 
incumbent S. In particular, when 05 e ( — ——2—k 1—2—-—_ ) 
^  \ { \  • ¥ y ) { a - c + \ - q - b )  a - c + \ - q - b  J  
there are at least two "sensible" sequential equilibria (Equilibria HI and VTI in the 
Appendix 11). Observation of payoffs for different equilibrium assessments indicates that 
the maximum equilibrium payoff of weak incumbent S \s a. decreasing flmction of its 
reputation, i.e. equilibrium payoff is a globally decreasing of reputation. 
Eu, i 
Equflibrinm m 
Eqnfllbrium I 
I-q-b 
1-q-b+a-c 
Figure 2.11. The expected utility of weak incumbent 5 as a function of pj. 
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Equilibrium m 
Eiiuilibrium VH 
Equilibrium V 
Equilibrium IV 
B *s 
A = p_ W-b . c-JL.-
(l-q-b+a-c)(l+y) ' 1-q-b+a-c ' 1+y ' 
Value of E is a function of . 
Figure 2.12. The expected utiHty of weak incumbent ^ as a function of p^. 
2.3.5. Game with More than Two Periods 
In subsection 2.3.3 we have completely characterized the solution to the incomplete 
information game with two periods. For each pair of initial reputations we have presented 
assessment(s) that satisfy requirements of "sensible" sequential equilibrium and 
corresponding equilibrium payoffs of weak incumbents. We could take these continuation 
payofFs as given and try to solve for the three period game. But there is a potential 
difBculty in doing this, since for some ranges of prior probabilities the two-period game 
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has multiple equilibria and, hence, non-unique continuation payoffs. Unless one has a 
satisfactory criterion to discard some of the equilibria, the task of finding a recursive 
solution for some ranges of initial reputations is practically impossible. Such a criterion 
cannot be found since for some ranges of prior probabilities there exist symmetric 
equilibria (for instance, equilibria in and IV for initial reputations satisfying 
-r^— < pI,Pt  < ^ —r)' And it is impossible to distinguish between the two, 1 a - c + \ - q - b '  
unless one has a strong preference over some of the English letters. Another difficulty in 
solving for the game with more than two periods is that formulas for some of the 
equilibrium mixing probabilities in the two period game are very cumbersome. This makes 
it very difficult to find an analytical solution by invoking mathematical induction. 
One should not interpret the discussion of the previous paragraph as a statement that 
for no range of initial reputations can a closed form solution can be found. Instead of 
identifying ranges of initial reputations for which tractable solutions can be easily found we 
consider an infinitely repeated version of our game. We find a lower bound on equilibrium 
payoffs of a sufficiently patient weak incumbent in any Nash equilibrium. Our presentation 
here follows closely that of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and some results are slight 
modifications of dieirs. 
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In this subsection we consider the case when the game form of Figure 2.1 is played by 
incumbents S and T against a countably infinite sequence of different entrants. That is, we 
consider an infinitely repeated game where in each period / = 0,1,... each incumbent 
i = S,T chooses an action a, fi-om the action space/4o={fight, accommodate} and period 
Cs entrant chooses an action a\ fi-om the action space /4i={enter, stay out}. Let A, 
(/ = 0,1) denote the space of mixed stage game actions corresponding to the action space 
A,. Mixed stage game action of incumbent i = S,T is denoted by a,. Also, let ai denote 
entrant's mixed stage game action. The information structure of this game is the same as 
that of Section 2.3.1. We assume that initial reputations for toughness satisfy 
0 < PS,PT < 1. 
In this perturbed game weak incumbents 5 and T (as well as tough types) maximize 
their normalized discounted values of expected payoffs using discount factors Ss and Sr 
respectively, where 0 < 5s,5t < I. That is, if one denotes by g- weak incumbent /'s 
(/• = S,T) period-^ payoff, then the sequence of payoffs ... has a normalized value 
00 
(1 - denote the least pyofif to weak incumbent / = 5,r in any Nash 
/=0 
equilibrium of the perturbed game. 
Each entrant bases entry decision on its assessment of the likelihood of the two 
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incumbents' actions. In our analysis we use Lemma 1 of Fudenberg and Levine (1989) 
which describes the process of statistical inference by the short-run players (entrants in our 
case) if a long-run player (there are two of them in our analysis) chooses the same action in 
each period (for the statement of the lemma, see Chapter I). The application of this lemma 
to our model implies the following. If there is a positive initial probability of incumbent 
i = S,T being a tough type (/7, > 0) and if incumbent / always fights then there is a fixed 
finite bound /c(p,) on the number of periods in which incumbent J ^ i and the entrants will 
believe that entry is "unlikely" to be fought. Note that this lemma does not assert that 
incumbent j ^ i and the entrants eventually become convinced that incumbent i is a tough 
type if they observe that incumbent / fought in every period. Rather, incumbent /'s 
opponents become convinced that it will fight in the fiiture. 
Let O {as, ar, ai) be the subset of Ao xAo corresponding to the pairs of strategies 
(a's, a'r) of incumbents S and T such that (as, ar, ai) leads to the same terminal node as 
(a's, a'T,ai). Similar to Fudenberg and Levine (1989), we call these strategies 
observationally equivalent (see Chapter 1). For our game, O (accommodate, 
accommodate, out) = O (accommodate, fight, out) = O (fight, accommodate, out) = O 
(fight, fight, out) = {(accommodate, accommodate), (accommodate, fight), (fight. 
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accommodate), (fight, fight)} and O (as, ar,in) = {(as, aj)} for all {as, 
a r }  e  A o  ^ A „ .  
Let B : Ao ^Aa Ai be the correspondence mapping pairs of mixed strategies of 
incumbents S and T to the best responses of the entrant. It is easy to note that B 
(accommodate, accommodate) = {in} and B (accommodate, fight) = B (fight, 
accommodate) = (fight, fight)={out}. 
For each as define 
WS {fls) = {ail there exist no Oj and aj with support in O {as, aj, ai) such that 
ai e 5(as,ar)}. 
We prove our theorem for the case of weak incumbent S (the case of weak incumbent 
r is absolutely symmetric). 
Theorem; There exists a/:(p,) such that F, > - q )  -^a]+(I -5*^'''')(-<5i). 
Proof; 
If a I 6 WS (fight), then there is a probability Jr(ai) such that ai is not a best response 
to (as. Or) which places weight at least 7t onO (fight, ar, ai). Let Jt = max7r(ai). Each 
time entrant plays ai in WS (fight), the observed outcome (fighting) will be one that was 
expected with probability less than W. The rest of the proof follows Lemma I of Fudenberg 
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and Levine (1989). 
It follows directly from the theorem that as 5, -<• I die right hand side of inequality (3) 
tends to (I - - qa. That is, as weak incumbent becomes sufficiently patient its payoff in 
any Nash equilibrium exceeds (1 -q) - qa. 
2.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have extended the basic chain-store game to the two-incumbent 
case. We considered a highly stylized model where two established firms populate a finite 
number of geographic locations (markets). In each of these markets there is a threat of 
potential entry by a different competitor. Potential entrants move sequentially and choose 
whether to enter a market duopolized by the two incumbent firms. In case of entry, each of 
the two incumbents simultaneously and independently decides whether to meet entry by 
aggressive or a peaceful response. If a potential competitor decides to stay out, then the 
two incumbents split market profits. The entrant prefers to enter only if both established 
firms meet entry peacefully. Entry accommodation is the best short-run response for both 
incumbents. In the sequential game, outcomes in previous markets become knovm to all 
later players. In Section 2.2 we considered a finitely repeated game of complete 
information and showed that none of the potential competitors is deterred from entering in 
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the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. 
In the model of Section 2.3 we have investigated equilibrium behavior in the 
incomplete information setting where each of the incumbents may have an initial reputation 
for being a "tough" type that will fight entry in each market along any equilibrium path. In 
that model each incumbent possesses as much prior information about its counterpart as 
the potential entrants in a sense that it assesses the same (as entrants) probability to the 
event that the other incumbent enjoys fighting. We completely characterized the solution of 
the two-period game and showed that over some range of initial reputations a weak 
incumbent's payoff is a globally decreasing ftmction of its reputation. This interesting 
result stands in sharp contrast to the existing versions of chain-store game where high 
reputation for toughness always benefits a weak incumbent. In Section 2.3 we also found 
the lower bound on a sufficiently patient incumbent's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the 
infinitely repeated version of the game. This bound is larger than the lowest payoff 
predicted by the Folk theorem. 
In our highly stylized analysis we did not provide a sufficiently rich economic structure 
that would rationalize incumbents' short-run benefit from fighting. We are planning to 
pursue this line of research in the sequel to this work. We envision a model where firms 
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compete in prices and eacii of the established firms possesses a superior information about 
its private cost function and where a low-cost incumbent (synonymous to a "tough" 
incumbent in our analysis) prefers to set such a low price in the short-run that entry is 
discouraged. An important distinguishing characteristic of this analysis will be that, even if 
tliere is no entry, interaction between the incumbents is a signal of their respective costs 
and, hence, will affect entry decisions of subsequent rivals. This is subsumed in the present 
analysis for the sake of presentability. 
One could also extend our analysis to more general games where two or more long-run 
players face a finite or infinite sequence of short-run players and where each long-run 
player possesses private information about its payoffs (and, hence, may try to maintain 
certain reputations). As our analysis suggests, the degree of common and conflicting 
interests of long-run players may determine equilibrium behavior when the game has a 
sufficiently short finite horizon. While if the horizon becomes sufficiently long one of the 
effects may dominate the other. 
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CHAPTER 3. STATE TRADING COMPANIES, TIME CONSISTENCY, 
IMPERFECT ENFORCEABILITY and REPUTATION' 
3.1. Introduction 
Strategic trade in international markets is imponant for agricultural and other basic 
commodities. Distribution systems for these commodities are dominated by agents that 
have the potential for exclusive monopoly power. State trading companies (STC) and large 
private firms control most of the trade volume. For agriculture in particular, the seasonal 
nature of the production process compared to a relatively constant demand for the 
commodities brings into play as well concepts of timing in trade contracting and rime 
consistent behavior. 
Some of the earliest papers that investigate issues of time consistency in trade are 
Lapan (1988), Maskin and Newbery (1990) and Staiger and Tabellini (1987). Melkonian 
and Johjiooi! (1996) have explored a model in which a STC, which has monopsony power, 
cannot credibly commit to a particular policy or contract. An annual trading cycle was 
considered. In the sequence of economic decisions, the STC moves first and announces a 
planned level of import. Producers in the exporring countries make their decisions on the 
allocation of the more fixed inputs (e.g., land) based on related price expectations. 
However, before they make decisions on the allocation of the more variable inputs (e.g.. 
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labor or fertilizer), the STC has the opportunity to revise the announced level of imports. 
Then, the labor or variable input allocation decisions of the producers are made, given the 
revised (and predetermined) level of imports and the previous allocation of the more fixed 
inputs. Finally, trade takes place. 
A standard monopsony argument can be used to obtain the optimal level of import, if 
the STC can commit itself to the announced import level. But, when the STC cannot be 
held to the precommitted or the ex ante optimal level of import, it has an incentive to set a 
lower ex post level, once the land allocation decision has been made (the STC will face an 
ex post supply that is less elastic than the ex ante supply). In standard terminology, the ex 
ante optimal level of import is not time-consistent. If foreign producers are assumed to 
know the rule used in setting ex post level of import, they will use this information when 
making their land allocation decisions. We showed that both the importer (STC) and the 
exporting countries are worse off as a result of inability of the importer to precommit to the 
optimal level of import. It is shown that forward contracts allow one to support the ex ante 
optimal level of import as a time-consistent equilibrium. We also considered the case when 
the importer is better informed than the exporter and showed that under some scenarios the 
importer cannot benefit fi"om the superiority of its information. 
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In this paper, we use a standard game theoretic formulation to model the strategic 
behavior we have described, and to explain apparent anomalies in trade performance. The 
same game theoretic formulations can be used to examine the impact of mechanisms with 
the potential for dealing with time inconsistency. In particular, precommitment penalties 
that might be enforced by bonding or other types of trade management systems are 
evaluated. These mechanisms can result in Pareto superior trade (and investment) patterns. 
An alternative is to consider the trading strategies in a sequential game context. The 
implications of signaling and reputation effects are at issue in this sequential or multi-stage 
trading context. This formulation opens the possibility of behavior that avoids the 
suboptimal elements of the single period game. As well, the strategies that emerge suggest 
alternative mechanisms that dominate the unregulated outcomes for the simple sequential 
game, even if they involve contracts that are imperfectly enforceable. 
3.2. The Perfect Information Game 
We consider a sequential game between two players. The game has three periods. In 
the first period, player 1 (the STC) announces the policy she intends to implement in the 
third period. That is, player 1 makes one of two announcements; "benevolent" or 
"nonbenevolent". This announcement becomes known to player 2 (the STC's trading 
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partner). After either of the two announcements is made, players 1 and 2 play the game 
depicted in Figure 3 1 (numbers at the decision nodes in the game tree represent the player 
whose turn it is to move; the first of the pair of numbers at terminal nodes represents 
payofF of player 1, and the second, the payoff of player 2). As will be clear, the "cheap 
talk" of player 1 does not affect the future strategic interaction between the players. 
•> 
(x,,y,) (0,0) (xjj:) (X3,y3) 
Figure 3.1. Investment choice - policy implementation sequence. 
Specifically, in the subgame following player I's initial announcement, player 2 moves 
and chooses one of two levels of investment, "high" or "low" (/i and / in Figure 3.1). After 
observing the level of investment, player 1 makes her choice of policy to be implemented; 
"benevolent" or' nonbenevolent" [b and nb in Figure 3.1). The complete (with the policy 
announcement) game form and the payoffs to the players, depending on the history of the 
game, are shown in Figure 3.2. Note that the two proper subgames starting at the nodes 
where it is player 2's turn to move are equivalent (the game forms and the payoffs are the 
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same). This reflects the noncredible cheap talk announcement of player 1. 
Now, consider in more detail payoffs to the players for different strategy profiles. For 
both of the possible levels of investment selected by player 2, player 1 's payoff is higher if 
she chooses to implement nonbenevolent compared to the benevolent policy; .vi <0 and 
.V: < .V3. In contrast, player 2's payoff, given that the investment decision has been made, 
is higher if the benevolent policy is implemented by player 1; >*1 >0 and >'2 > If an 
investment decision is followed by a benevolent policy, player 2's payoff is higher when he 
chooses high; vi > y\. While if an investment decision is followed by a non-benevolent 
policy, player 2s payoff is higher when he chooses low; >*3 < 0. Player 1 's payoff is higher 
when high investment is followed by a benevolent policy than in the case when low is 
followed by non-benevolent; .v; > 0. We also assume that .V3 + .vi > 0. With this 
assumption, the sign restrictions on the payoffs can be easily summarized; x\ < 0. 
0 < x: < X3, andxj -hxi > 0;>'3 < 0 and 0 <>'1 < V:. 
Consider either of the two proper subgames follov^ng initial policy announcement, i.e. 
the game depicted in Figure 3.1. If player 2 chooses low, player 1 chooses between .YI if 
she plays benevolent and 0 if she plays nonbenevolent. Thus, obviously player 1 wall play 
nonbenevolent. The same reasoning leads us to conclude that when high investment is 
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chosen by player 2, nonbenevolent policy will be implemented (in that case, player 1 
chooses between xz and .vj). That is, nonbenevolent is the ex post (after the investment 
decision) optimal policy. Anticipating that either level of investment will be followed by 
implementation of nonbenevolent policy, player 2, when making his investment decision, 
chooses between 0 if he plays low and V3 if he plays high. Obviously, he will choose the 
low investment. When making her initial announcement, player 1, anticipating that she and 
her opponent will play optimally at later nodes, chooses beuveen 0 if she announces 
benevolent and 0 if nonbenevolent, and she is indifferent between the two. 
1 
(x„y,) (0,0) (X2,y2) (X3,y,) (x„yi) (0,0) (XiJi) (X3,y3) 
Figure 3.2. The Basic Model. 
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This argument is just a simple application of backward induction to the solution of a 
game of perfect information.'" Thus, we have shown that this game has two subgame 
perfect equilibria: (1) player 1 initially announces benevolent and implements 
nonbenevolent policy for all levels of investment, and for either of the initial 
announcements, piayer 2 chooses low investment no matter what the initial announcement; 
and (2) player 1 initially announces non-benevolent, and the actions at all other information 
sets are the same as for the first strategy profile (the second equilibrium differs from the 
first only by the move of player 1 at her first information set). The equilibria payoffs of 
both players are the same for both of the strategy profiles. Both yield a payoff of 0. 
Now, suppose that there is a mechanism that allows player 1 to credibly precommit to 
a policy or announcement. One possible mechanism can be described as follows: suppose 
that before the game player 1 signs a perfectly enforceable (binding) agreement saying that 
she is going to bum $c (c > x^) if she does not implement the announced policy. The tree 
for this game is presented in Figure 3.3. Note that the game form is unchanged and only 
the payoffs to player 1 at the terminal nodes, corresponding to histories where the 
announced and implemented policies differ, have been modified (for example, announcing 
benevolent and implementmg nonbenevolent policy). There is also another interpretation of 
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the extensive form game presented in Figure 3.3. Suppose that player 1 is known for sure 
to be "commitment" (or an "honest") type, that is a player who gets a very high negative 
payoff ($c) from reneging on her announcement in the first period. In other 
words, player I incurs very high cost from being inconsistent. 
Figure 3.3. The game with perfectly enforceable commitment mechanism. 
We solve the game with this commitment mechanism. Consider the proper subgame 
starting with the node following player 1 's initial announcement of benevolence. If player 2 
chooses low, player 1 chooses between .vi if she plays benevolent and (0 - c) if she plays 
non-benevolent. Thus, obviously player 1 will choose benevolent. The same reasoning 
leads us to conclude that benevolent policy will be implemented by player 1 when high 
1 
(x,,y,) (-c,0) (Xj,y2) (X3-c,y3)(Xi-c,yi)(0,0) (X2-c»yi) (X2,y2) 
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investment is chosen by player 2 (in this case, player 1 would choose between .v; and 
(.V3 - c)). Hence, when player 2 makes his investment decision after the announcement of 
benevolence and anticipates the above characterized response (implementation of the 
benevolent policy), he chooses between if he chooses low and yz if he chooses high. 
Surely, he will choose high investment. 
Applying the same reasoning (backward induction) to the proper subgame starting 
with the node following a nonbenevolent announcement, we find that in the subgame either 
investment decision will be followed by the implementation of the nonbenevolent policy 
and player 1 (anticipating the nonbenevolent response) v/ill choose low investment. Thus, 
rolling back the payoffs of the players (when the strategies obtained by backward induction 
are followed) to the nodes that follow initial announcement, we see that player 1 chooses 
between x; if she chooses benevolent announcement and 0 if she chooses nonbenevolent. 
And hence, she wll choose benevolent. Thus, we have shown that this game has unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium, where; player 1 announces benevolent in period I and at the 
node following a particular announcement, she implements the policy that was announced; 
player 2 chooses high if benevolent was announced and low if nonbenevolent. The 
subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs to the players are (.v:,^':). 
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We could consider yet a larger game where player 1 chooses in period 0 whether to 
play the game described in Figure 3.2 or the game of Figure 3,3 (the first interpretation 
(burning money) will be chosen for Figure 3.2, since it is not sensible to assume that 
people choose to be honest or not) and that decision is made known to player 1. In this 
game player 1 will choose the game with the precommitment mechanism. There are two 
subgame perfect equilibria of this game: player 1 in period 0 chooses to play the game with 
commitment mechanism and the choices of both players after the choice in period 0 are 
exactly the same as equilibria strategy profiles of players 1 and 2 for the games presented 
in Figures 3,2 and 3.3. 
The multiplicity of equilibria arises fi-om the fact that the proper subgame following the 
choice of player I not to choose a commitment mechanism has two subgame perfect 
equilibria (as described above). The payoffs for both the equilibria described are (xzyVz)-
Thus, if player 1 has an option of a commitment mechanism, she will use that option and 
the payoffs of both players are higher in the game when this option is available 
(.V2 > Q,y2 > 0), as compared with the case when it is not. 
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3.3. The Finitely Repeated Version of the Game Without Commitment 
Consider the strategic situation when player 1 does not have access to the commitment 
mechanism and there are finitely many trading cycles after policy announcement is made, 
.'^gain, there are two players. The game has A^+ 1 stages {N is a positive integer). We 
index time backwards; i.e., the first stage of the game is + 1, second N, and so on. At the 
stage A^+ 1, player 1 makes one of two announcements, benevolent or nonbenevolent. 
After the announcement is made and observed by player 2, the game depicted in Figure 3.1 
is played N times. We assume that the announcement in stage // + 1 is noncredible in a 
sense that it does not affect the moves available to the players and the payoffs for each 
strategy profile (the two proper subgames, following the announcement, are exactly the 
same). 
The sign restrictions for different strategy profiles are the same as in the previous 
section.'' Tl-ie payotFs of players 1 and 2 are the sums (undiscounted) of their respective 
payoffs in the stages of the game. This is a finite game with perfect information, which 
again can be solved by application of backward induction. First, let us conjecture how the 
game might progress. We might expect that player 1 will announce benevolent in stage 
N+I, and then will implement benevolent policy no matter what the level of investment, to 
convince player 2 that she is honest (committed to her announcement), and that she will 
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continue to implement the announced policy. In other words, player 1 will try to establish a 
reputation for being a "commitment" type. Observing this kind of choice by player 1. 
player 2 will become convinced that player 1 will keep to the announced policy 
(benevolent) and will choose high investment level. Thus, we would expect benevolent 
policy to be implemented and high investment for player 2 in the first stages of the game. 
However, we also expect that this kind of behavior will not be observable at very late 
stages in the game, since later in die game there is not much benefit fi^om demonstrating 
commitment (the reputation value is low). That is, we would expect nonbenevolent policies 
to be implemented at later stages of the game. Though the behavior we have just described 
seems likely to develop and is very intuitive, the game theoretic prediction discards it. 
To solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium, consider a proper subgame starting with 
the node following either of the two armouncements. Within that subgame consider the last 
stage. In this stage, player 1 will implement the nonbenevolent policy for both levels of 
investment by player 2, since there are no gains left to maintain her reputation. Anticipating 
this response, player 2 will choose low investment. In the next to the last stage, player 1 
will implement nonbenevolent policy whatever level of investment, since it is more 
beneficial in the shon-run and does not affect the play in the last stage. Anticipating this. 
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player 2 will choose low investment in the next to the last stage. Carrying this argument to 
the beginning of the subgame, we find that player 2 chooses low investment in all stages, 
and player 1 always implements the nonbenevolent policy. Again, as in the Section 2, the 
game has two subgame perfect equilibria, which differ only by the initial announcement 
and have low investment and nonbenevolent policy implementation for each possible 
history. The equilibrium payoffs for both strategy profiles are (0,0). 
Now, suppose we consider the game which consists of K stages {K is finite positive 
integer), where each stage is exactly the game described above (announcement of a policy 
followed by N repetitions of the game in Figure 3.1). Again, we reach conclusion that the 
subgame perfect equilibria will have low investment and nonbenevolent policies 
implemented for all information sets (Recall that all information sets are singletons in this 
game). Thus, even in the case when there are multiple (and finite) subperiods of 
announcements followed by investment choice-implementation sequences, the reputation 
effect does not "come alive". In summary, although it is intuitive and plausible for player 1 
to try to maintain a reputation for being a commitment type by implementing the policy 
announced to persuade player 2 to make a high investment, in none of the subgame perfect 
equilibria is this an optimal strategy. 
3.4. Imperfect Enforceability, Pooling and Reputation Effects 
We have shown that, for the basic game, if there is an option of commitment 
mechanism that is also perfectly enforceable then high investment is chosen and the ex ante 
optimal policy is implemented. This results in a payoff increase for both players. Then, we 
turned to the case when the trading game is repeated finitely many times, but with the 
commitment mechanism absent. We showed that no matter how many (finite) times the 
game is to be played, reputation effects do not come alive and the payoffs to the players are 
the same as in the one-period version of the game (0,0). 
In this section we investigate a model with an imperfectly enforceable commitment 
mechanism. As before, the commitment mechanism obliges the party (player I), reneging 
on announcement, to pay a penalty of Sc. 
First, consider the game where announcement of the policy is made followed by N 
repetitions of investment choice-implementation sequence. As previously, we assume that 
the game has two players. Before the game is played, player 1 makes a contract with the 
third party, which obliges her to implement the announced policy. The information, on 
whether this commitment contract is going to be honored is, however, the private 
information of player I. That is, the commitment contract with the third party is 
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"imperfectly enfoiceable." We assume that player 2 has prior probability belief p that 
player I's payoffs are the same as in Figure 3.3, each time she reneges on her 
announcement. That is, p is the probability of player 1 's being the commitment type. With 
probability (1 -p) player I's payoffs are as in Figure 3.2. That is, (\ -p) is the 
probability of player 1 being a noncommitment type, for whom the policy announcement is 
a cheap talk. In other words, player 2 is uncertain about player 1 's cost of reneging on her 
announcement. This is a game of incomplete information (Harsanyi (1967-68)), which can 
be transformed into a game of imperfect information where nature moves first and chooses 
player I's payoff structure, player 1 observes nature's move but player 2 does not. The 
game with a single investment choice-policy implementation stage is depicted in Figure 
3.4. We denote by 9c the commitment type player 1, and by 6„ the noncommitment type. 
Figure 3.4. The game with imperfect information. 
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We first analyze the game depicted in Figure 3.4 and then move on to solve the case of 
an arbitrary number (finite) of investment choice-policy implementation stages. Note, that 
for the commitment type it is a strictly dominated strategy to renege on the announcement 
made in the first stage. Thus, we can eliminate the strategies where commitment type 
implements policy different than the one announced as possibilities for equilibrium 
behavior. Given an initial announcement and either investment level, implementation of the 
nonbenevolent policy is optimal for the noncommitment type (by application of backward 
induction). In other words, it is a strictly dominated continuation strategy for the 
noncommitment type to implement benevolent policy at any information set. Eliminating 
the strictly dominated strategies for different player 1 types, it is easy to show that the best 
response for player 2 at the information set following nonbenevolent announcement is to 
choose low investment for any beliefs about the type of player 1 (commitment type 
implements the policy announced, and the noncommitment type always implements 
nonbenevolent policy). 
Thus, the choice of the low investment after the announcement of the nonbenevolent 
policy is justified. Given these rounds of elimination of the strictly dominated continuation 
strategies, the strategies in which the noncommitment type of player 1 announces the 
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nonbenevolent policy are weakly dominated by the strategy where she announces the 
benevolent and implements the nonbenevolent policy for either investment level. To 
eliminate weakly dominated strategies, we invoke Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) 
requirement that the equilibria set be stable. Elimination of weakly dominated strategies 
corresponds to setting their admissibility condition. The above described elimination of 
dominated strategies has allowed us to reduce the set of possible modes of behavior for the 
two players. Now. we can move on to finding the Nash equilibria of the game in Figure 
3.4. 
Note, that no matter what the value of p in the interval [0,1), the following strategy 
profile is a Nash equilibrium of the game in Figure 3.4: 
i) the commitment type of player 1 announces nonbenevolent policy and at the 
information sets following a particular announcement implements that promise; the 
noncommitment type announces benevolent policy and implements nonbenevolent policy 
given either level of investment and either aruiouncement; 
ii) player 2 chooses low investment following either announcement by player 1. 
It is easy to note that the equilibrium just described is sequential if we specify beliefs at 
the two information sets of player 2 using Bayes' law to update prior beliefs, given player 
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1 's equilibrium strategy. We denote this equilibrium by (*). Using the terminology of 
signaling games, this equilibrium is separating in a sense that the signal (the 
announcement) sent by player 1 in the first stage reveals her type. This equilibrium set 
(singleton) is also stable. To find all possible equilibria, we consider two possible cases 
differentiated by the magnitude of p and relative values of player 2's payoffs for different 
strategy profiles: 
(3.1) /? > 
(the case in which the relative likelihood of player Is being a commitment type is high) 
Consider the strategy of player 1 where her both types announce benevolent with 
probability 1. Then Bayes' updating yields posterior which is equal to prior beliefs about 
type of player 1. That is, probability that player 1 is of commitment type, given that both 
types announce benevolent with probability one, is equal to p. Then, given updated beliefs 
and player Ts optimal strategies following the investment decision, player 2's expected 
payofF from high investment is equal to pyz + il -p)>'3 and from low investment to 
pyi +(l -p)0. Hence, if the inequality (3.1) is sarisfied and player 1 uses the strategy 
described above, player 2 will choose high investment. Thus, following strategy profiles 
and beliefs of player 2 about player 1 constitute a sequential equilibrium (also stable as a 
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set): 
i) Both player 1 types announce benevolent policy in the first stage; at the information 
sets following a particular announcement commitment type of player 1 implements the 
announced policy (implementation of benevolent policy after announcement of 
benevolence, and similarly for non-benevolent policy), the noncommitment type chooses to 
implement nonbenevolent strategy at all of her information sets; 
ii) Player 2 chooses low investment at the information set following nonbenevolent 
announcement, and chooses high investment at the information set following benevolent 
announcement; 
Hi) At the information set following the benevolent announcement, the probability 
(posterior) that player I is of commitment type is equal to the prior p (Bayesian updating is 
invoked using equilibrium strategy of player 1); at the information set following the 
nonbenevolent announcement the posterior probability that player I is of commitment type 
is equal to q, where q is any real number in the segment [0,1], 
It is easy to observe that (strategy profile, beliefs) pair is consistent and sequentially 
rational (requirements of a sequential equilibrium). This is a pooling equilibnum in the 
sense that both player I types choose to send the same signal (announcement of 
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benevolence). The equilibrium payoffs of the noncommitment type of player 1 and of 
player 2 are .v;, and pyz + (1 - p)y-i respectively. Payoffs of both players are higher than in 
the case when player 1 does not have a reputation for being a commitment type (that is, 
when p = 0). 
Recall, that for the values of p satisfying inequality (I) the (strategy profile, beliefs) 
pair (*) also represents a sequential equilibrium. But, the outcome payoffs of both players 
for this equilibrium are Pareto dominated by the equilibrium payoffs for the just described 
pooling equilibrium. We use the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium'- concept of Bemheim. 
et al. (1987) to discard the equilibrium (*). We argue that the pooling equilibrium is more 
likely to be played than separating one, because if preplay communication were possible 
then both players would have an incentive to agree to play pooling equilibrium (which is a 
self-enforcing mode of behavior). 
When the initial reputation for credibility is low 
( J . 2 )p  <  
the only sequential equilibrium, which also survives the elimination of dominated 
(strictly as well as weakly) strategies, is separating where the noncommitment type 
chooses the benevolent announcement and the commitment type chooses the 
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nonbenevolent announcement (that is, equilibrium (*)). The equilibrium payoffs of both 
player 1 types and player 2 are equal to zero, i.e. they are the same as in the case when 
player does not have a reputation for being commitment type. 
Our  conc lu s ions  can  be  ea s i l y  summar i zed ;  Fo r  t he  game  whe re  t he r e  i s  on ly  one  
investment choice-policy implementation stage after the policy announcement, if the prior 
probability of player 1 being a commitment type is not sufficiently large the resulting 
equilibrium is the one where the different player 1 types separate in the first stage 
(announcing different policies) and the equilibrium payoffs of both players are equal to 
zero (same as when there is no reputation for being a commitment type). When reputation 
of being commitment type is sufficiently large, the pooling equilibrium is the only one that 
survives all the criteria that we have imposed and payoffs of both players are higher than in 
the case where reputation is absent. 
Now, we consider a more general game in that we allow the announcement stage to be 
followed by arbitrary but finite number of investment choice-policy implementation stages. 
Again, there are two players in the game; player I and player 2. The game has N + I stages 
(JV is a positive integer). As previously, we index time backwards. Again, the first stage of 
the game is yV + 1, second yV, etc. At the stage N + 1 player 1 makes one of two 
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announcements' benevolent or nonbenevolent. After the announcement is made and 
observed by player 2, the investment choice-policy implementation game form is played /V 
times. But in contrast to the game described in the third section, player 2 is uncertain about 
the payoffs of player 1, and holds a prior probability p that player I incurs a cost each time 
she (player 1) reneges on the announcement (her payoffs are as in Figure 3.3). With 
probability (1 - p) the payoffs of player 1 for each stage game are those given in Figure 
3.2. That is, (1 -p) is the probability of player 1 being a noncommitment type. The 
payoffs of players 1 and 2 are the expected sums (undiscounted) of their respective payoffs 
in the stages of the game. In the following we will be interested in the payoffs for the 
noncommitment type of player I and payoffs of player 2. 
Before trying to determine how this game will be played, note that commitment type of 
player 1 will implement the announced policy along each equilibrium path of this game. 
That is, there are two possibilities for commitment type's behavior in equilibrium: 
announce and then in all stages implement benevolent policy, or announce and then in all 
stages execute nonbenevolent policy. Note, that our model differs from other reputation 
models since we allow the type, whose reputation is to be maintained, to be strategic, i.e. 
that player type is not restricted to a single strategy along the equilibrium path. 
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Let hj denote the history of the game up to stage j. Player 2 will update his beliefs 
about the player I type conditional on the previous moves of both players {hj). We denote 
these beliefs at the beginning of stage j by Pj. As indicated above, pj is a function of hj. For 
any value of p (the initial reputation for being the commitment type) between 0 and I. the 
following strategy profile and belief structure constitute a sequential equilibrium; 
i) the commitment type player 1 announces nonbenevolent policy and at the 
information sets following a particular announcement implements the promised policy; the 
noncommitment type announces benevolent policy and implements nonbenevolent at all of 
her information sets; 
ii) player 2 chooses low at all of his information sets; 
iii) at all information sets following the announcement of nonbenevolent policy, player 
2's belief that player 1 is commitment type is equal to 1; at all information sets following 
the announcement of benevolent strategy, player 2's belief that player 1 is commitment 
type is equal to 0. 
It is possible to show that the equilibria set (a singleton) just described is stable. Using 
terminology of signaling games, this is a separating equilibrium, because the signal (in this 
case, the signal is an announcement of policy) sent in the first stage of the game reveals 
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sender's type. Subsequently, we term this a separating equilibrium. 
This game also has another sequential equilibrium for large enough p and/or N. To 
solve for this equilibrium of the finite game of imperfect information, we first find the 
sequential equilibrium when there is only one investment choice-policy implementation 
stage after the announcement. Then we solve when there are two stages, and then invoke 
mathematical induction to find the solution for arbitrary (finite) number of stages. The 
following strategies and beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium'^ if; 
Beliefs: 
i) ps~\ = p; 
ii) For any j < N, probability that player 1 is of commitment type at each information 
set of player 2 following announcement of nonbenevolent policy is equal to one; 
iii) px = p at the information set following benevolent announcement; 
iv) If the history of the game up to stage j < N includes benevolent announcement and 
any instance of implementation of nonbenevolent policy then Pj = 0; 
v) Ifpj.i = 0 dien pj = 0; 
vi) If benevolent policy was initially announced, y > I, pj < ^ ) and 
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the investment decision is followed by implementation of the benevolent policy in stage /, 
then Pj., = 
vii) If benevolent policy was initially announced, 7 > Pj > (and 
the investment decision is followed by implementation of the benevolent policy in stage y, 
thenpy-i = Pj .  
The strategy of player 1 is described as follows: 
i) the commitment type announces benevolent policy in stage N + 1 and at information 
sets following an announcement of benevolence she implements benevolent, at information 
sets following nonbenevolent she implements nonbenevolent; 
ii) the noncommitment type announces benevolent policy in stage A" + I; at all 
information sets following a nonbenevolent announcement she implements nonbenevolent 
policy; the choice of the noncommitment type at the information sets following benevolent 
announcement (nodes following both high and low investment) depends on Pj andy: 
Ify" = 1 then she implements the nonbenevolent policy, given any investment choice: 
Ify" > I m d p ,  >  -^ "^ 1"'- v y  ' then she implements the benevolent policy; 
Ify > 1 and p, < Y ' then she implements the benevolent policy with 
I l l  
probability (where A = and the nonbenevolent with ( i  - P j )  
complementary probability. 
The strategy of player 2 can be described using related conditions: 
Player 2 chooses high investment in stage j if Pj >  ( j — h e  c h o o s e s  l o w  
investment if pj < -y^-y^ J• Pj = {y2-y\-yi )^' " •"^'^o'^'^es 
between his choices, playing high with probability ^ in case when high investment 
was chosen in the previous stage and with probability if low investment was chosen 
in the previous stage. 
The nature of the equilibrium is the following; for eveiy p > 0 there is a number n { p )  
such that, if there are more than n(p) investment choice-policy implementation sequences 
remaining to be played, the noncommitment type will implement the benevolent policy and 
player 2 will choose high investment. The noncommitment type chooses nonbenevolent in 
the last stage and mixes between benevolent and nonbenevolent in stages M(p),...,2. 
Accordingly, player 2 mixes between high and low or chooses high with probability, which 
depends on the relative magnitudes of p and the players' payoffs. Thus, in each of the 
stages «(p),..., 1. reputation breaks down with positive probability. Reputation breaks 
1 1 2  
down in the later stages, since long-run value from having reputation for commitment is 
outweighed by the (opportunity) cost of pretending to be a commitment type. Note, that for 
large enough N, payoffs of both players converge to 3. 
For large enough p and/or N this equilibrium outcome dominates the separating 
outcome. Hence, applying the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium concept, we discard the 
separating equilibrium. 
If we consider a larger game consisting of K stages, where each stage is the game just 
described, then the equilibrium (that survives the refinements we pose) will have the 
following properties; In /if - 1 first stages, both types of player 1 announce the benevolent 
policy and subsequently implement benevolent in all periods of the stage: player 2 chooses 
high investment in all periods of the first K - 1 stages; the play in the last stage is the same 
as for the single stage game described above (that is, the game with announcement 
followed by N repetitions of investment choice-policy implementation sequence). 
3.5 Concluding Comments 
We have used concepts of modem game theory to treat time inconsistency issues 
associated with strategic trade. The results are particularly applicable to trade in 
commodities with production periods that are lengthy, as in agriculture. A game with a 
sequence of decisions is envisioned, in which an importing firm or country might announce 
its planned level of import. The producer or suppliers then "invest" by perhaps allocating 
land to the commodity to be exported. The importer may then change the first decision or 
be credible and follow through as planned. Clearly, the investment decision of the exporter 
will be different depending on whether or not the importer's announcement is believed 
(high or low in our stylized model). From the results on time consistency, we know that 
revision or noncommitment can lead to an outcome that is suboptimal compared to the 
initial (ex ante) decision on announcement. Mechanisms are then explored that impose a 
"cost" for the failure to honor the initial commitment. An example of such a mechanism in 
actual trade might be the posting of a bond by one of the parties. Both parties (the STC and 
Its trading partner) gain, if these mechanisms are perfectly enforceable. 
We investigated the game in which the parties are assumed to trade for more than one 
period, and where enforcement mechanisms are absent. Results show that the optimality 
problems are similar to those for the single stage game, in terms of their time inconsistency 
implications. Then the sequence of trading decisions or games is examined in which the 
commitment mechanism is present, but imperfectly enforceable (we represent this by 
assuming that informarion on whether a commitment contract will be honored is private 
1 1 4  
information of the STC). This opens the signaling possibilities and the use of experience 
with previous trading actions to establish reputations. We show that if the parties trade for 
sufficiently many periods and/or the initial reputation for being commitment type is 
sufficiently high, then reputation effects dominate the play of the game. Both players gain 
compared to the case in which the commitment mechanisms are absent. The major applied 
implication is for a role of some type of authority that could "enforce" announced 
intentions. 
Finally, we observe that the model of strategic trade has required innovations in the 
game theoretic formulation. The most important of these follow from the "personality" of 
the "commitment" type. 
The model provides an important context for exploring impacts of signaling, 
reputation, and third party interventions that approximate the institutions and authorities 
that govern international trade. 
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APPENDIX I. BASIC GAME THEORETIC CONCEPTS 
For the sake of completeness, in this appendix we discuss some equilibrium concepts 
frequendy employed in game theory. All definitions can be found in Fudenberg and Tirole 
{1991 a) or in any other Game Theory textbook. 
Definition; A strategy profile is a vector consisting of mixed strategies for all players. 
Definition; A strategy profile is a Nash equilibriwn if each player's strategy is an 
optimal response to die opponents' strategies. 
Definition; A subgame is a restriction of an extensive form game to a collection of 
nodes satisfying closure under succession and preservation of information sets. (That is, all 
nodes in an information set followed by all successors of all of its nodes). 
Definition; A proper subgame is a restriction of an extensive form game to an 
information set, consisting of a single node, with all of its successors. 
Definition; A strategy profile is a subgame perfect Mash equilibrium if the restriction 
of the strategy profile to every proper subgame is a Nash equilibrium. 
Definition; A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that each players 
strategy maximizes his expected payoff given prior beliefs about opponents' private 
information and their strategies. 
The equilibrium concept, usually employed in reputation models, is sequential 
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equilihrium (Kreps and Wilson (1982a)), This equilibrium is not simply a strategy profile, 
but a pair of two types of beliefs for each player: beliefs about where in the game tree he is 
for each possible history of the game, and beliefs about how other players will play. The 
system of beliefs is a sequence of functions (each function corresponding to a particular 
information set) from the nodes in the information set to [0,1 ] segment. That is, a system 
of beliefs reflects what a player believes about where he is in the information set (where it 
is his turn to move) if that information set is reached. An assessment is a pair (strategy 
profile, system of beliefs). An assessment is said to be consistent if it can be derived from 
Bayes' law using arbitrary small trembles from the strategy profile. An assessment is 
sequentially rational if behavior of each player satisfies the following property: for each 
player, his strategy starting from any information set is optimal, given his beliefs about 
where in the information set he is and given that the other players play according to their 
strategies from that information set on. An assessment, which satisfies consistency and 
sequential rationality properties, is sequential equilibrium. 
Another equilibrium concept, that in certain contexts is easier to apply than sequential 
equilibrium, is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991b) give a 
formal presentation of the concept. We only give their definition for the multi-stage games 
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with observed actions and independent prior distributions of players' private information. 
An assessment is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium if 
1) beliefs are updated using Bayes' law whenever possible (that is, for all information 
sets reached with positive probability along the equilibrium path); 
2) beliefs satisfy a no-signaling-what-you-don't-know condition which requires that i) 
posterior beliefs about players' types are distributed independently for any history of the 
game and ii) beliefs about type of a player at the beginning of period (/ + 1) depend only on 
the history of the game up to stage t and tiiat player's period-/ action; 
3) The strategies are a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for each subgame (where the 
probability distriburion over the nodes for each information set are defined using the beliefs 
of the assessment). 
Each Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is sequential, while the converse holds only in the 
case when each player has no more than two types and/or the game has no more than two 
stages. 
Definition; A strategy profile is an extensive-fom trembling hand perfect equilibrium 
if it is a limit of e-constrained equilibria as trembles e converge to 0. 
Let e ,  S . A ,  for each / denote a completely mixed action, that is, e ,  puts a strictly 
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positive weight on each action a, e A,. 
Definition; The strategy profile (cti ,0-2 ) ^ Sli x is an c-constrained equilibrium 
relative to (ci.en) if there exists a strategy profile (ctuCTt) such that for each history 
h e H ,  
i)ai (a))(/j) = (I -€)ai(co)(h) +ce\ for each w e Q; 
ii) 02 (A) = (1 - e)<72(/i) + ce:; 
iii) a I (Wo) is a best response to a: ; 
iv) az is a best response to CTi . 
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APPENDIX II. SOLUTION OF THE TWO-PERIOD GAME 
In this Appendix we prove that assessments characterized in Section 2.3.3 of this 
chapter form a sequential equilibrium of the two-stage game over a relevant range of initial 
reputations. Our discussion also shows that the equilibria presented in this Appendix 
exhaust the list of all "sensible" sequential equilibria. That is, there is no assessment other 
than the ones described here such that it is sequentially rational, consistent and "sensible" 
where "sensibility" means an additional restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs. We begin by 
discussing the properties possessed by all the equilibria including the "sensibility" 
requirement. Then we list equilibria assessments and the corresponding ranges of initial 
reputations over which these assessments satisfy requirements of sequential equilibrium. 
There we prove that the hypothesized assessments are a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
if only if initial reputations of the two incumbents belong to the specified range. Finally, we 
discuss the uniqueness properties of different equilibria where we show that for some 
ranges of initial rep'jtations there is a multiplicity of equilibria. 
To find players' optimal strategies we utilize an equilibrium concept stronger than 
sequential equilibrium in that we impose additional constraints on the players' beliefs 
following off-equilibrium play. In particular, we assume than in the event of 
accommodation by any incumbent, its reputation of being tough is updated to zero by other 
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players. This restriction is a version of Cho and Kreps' (1990) stability and Crawford and 
SobePs (1982) intuitive criterion. Given this restriction on beliefs tough incumbents will 
fight at any information set of the game. Also, in any sequential equilibrium of the game 
both weak incumbents accommodate in period I, tough entrants always enter, and weak 
entrant 1 enters if and only if the pair of updated reputations (JJS^PT) lies in the area V. 
Thus, when characterizing equilibria we focus on the actions of weak players in period 2 
and of weak entrant in period 1. 
Now we present equilibrium assessments and corresponding sets of initial reputations. 
Equilibrium 1; 
Conditions on initial reputations-. p%pf > ^. 
The set of probabilities (Ps,Pf) satisfying these inequalities is the shaded area of 
under our assumption on payoffs of weak incumbents and prior probability of an entrant 
being tough). This shaded area is the square with endpoints 
Figure 2.3 which is depicted for the case when 
a - c + l - q - b  ^  
I  - q - b  T-'— (which holds 1 +y 
1  -  q - b  I  -  q - b  ( 1 , 1 ) ,  
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The equilihrium strategies: 
Weak incumbent S accommodates with probability one in market 2, 
Weak incumbent T accommodates with probability one in market 2, 
Weak entrant 2 stays out. 
If there was an entry and accommodation by both incumbents in market 2 then weak entrant 1 
enters, otherwise it stays out. 
Tlie belie fs in the beginning of period I; 
If there was an entry in market 2 and it was followed by aggressive response of incumbent 
i = S,T then the posterior probability (assigned by incumbent j * / and entrant 1) that 
incumbent / is tough is equal to I. If incumbent i = S,T accommodated following entry in 
period 2 then the posterior probability that it is tough is equal to zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p] = p; for 
i = S,T. 
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period I are derived from Bayes' law 
(one of the requirements of consistency) which is applicable everywhere given priors and 
equilibrium strategies. Since equilibrium strategies prescribe accommodation for both 
weak incumbents in market 2, the posterior probability that incumbent i = S,T is tough 
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given that it fought entry in market 2 should equal to one by Bayes" law. Updating of priors 
also agrees with Bayes' law when there is no entry in period 2, Hence, the above specified 
assessment is consistent (a direct proof of consistency is also straightforward for each of 
the cases in this Appendix). Thus, it is left for us to check sequential rationality of the 
hypothesized assessment. Weak entrant 2 stays out since prior probabilities (Ps,Pf) lie 
outside area K For the same reason weak entrant 1 stays out if entrant 1 did not enter. And 
if there was an entry in period 2 and at least one of the incumbents fought then weak 
entrant 1 strictly prefers to stay out since only tough incumbents fight in market 2. Thus, to 
complete the proof that the assessment is sequentially rational we have to show that neither 
of the weak incumbents prefers fighting to accommodation following entry into market 2, 
We consider this condition for the expected utility of weak incumbent S. The case of weak 
incumbent T is absolutely symmetric. 
Given incumbent Ts equilibrium strategy and the belief structure, the expected utility 
of weak incumbent 5" from accommodation after entry in market 2 is equal to: 
(A1) £H5(accommodate) = PF[-C + EUSI* I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+ (I -pf)[0 + Eusi* I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated)], 
where Eusi* Itnc.r is tough & inc.J accommodated) is the expected utility of 
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incumbent S in period i given that i) incumbent T is tough (and, hence, fights in period 1) 
and ii) incumbent S accommodated in period 2; and Eus{.» lincT is weak «S; inc.^ S" 
accommodated) is the expected utility of incumbent S in period 1 given that i) incumbent T 
is weak (and, hence, accommodates in period I) and ii)incumbent S accommodated in 
period 2. These expected utilities have the following form; 
Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = q{.-c) + (1 -q)* 1;  
£ws(« I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent S from fighting, given that there was entry in 
period 2, is given by; 
(A2) Eusifight) = PT[~^ I '"^.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+  ( 1 - p f ) [ - b  + £ms(* 1 inc.T is weak &. inc.S fought)], 
where Eus{* \ inc.T" is tough & inc.ii' fought) is the expected utility of incumbent S in 
period I given that i) incumbent T is tough and ii) incumbent S fought in period 2; and 
Ens(» linc.r is weak & inc.i" fought) is the expected utility of incumbent S in period 1 
given that i) incumbent T is weak and ii) incumbent S fought in period 2. These expected 
utilities have the following form; 
Eus{» I inc.T is tough & inc. S fought) = q(.-c) -r (1 -q)» I;  
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Etis(» I inc.T is weak & inc. S fought) =q*Q + {\-q)'\. 
Substituting expressions for conditional expected utilities of incumbent .V in period 1 
into (A1) and (A2), we obtain: 
£i/s(accommodate) = - p f (  1 + <7) • c + (1 - q ) ,  
£Hs(fight) = - p f  • a - (1 - p f } »  b  - p f q *  c  +  { \  - q ) .  
Note that restriction pi > ^ —r is equivalent to condition 
'  '  a - c + \ - q - b  ^  
£Ms(accommodate) > £i<sCfight). Hence, both weak incumbents strictly prefer 
accommodation to fighting if and only if prior probabilities belong to the above specified 
range. Combining this with the fact that strategies of other players are optimal given the 
belief structure and the assessment is consistent, we obtain that condition on initial 
reputations is necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium. 
Equilibrium II: 
Conditions on initial repuiations: {pl,pf) belongs to the shaded area of Figure 2.4. 
This shaded area is the intersection of the square with endpoints (0,0), (0, j^), 
(—i—, -T-i—), (-7-1—,0) and the complement of area V. 
1 I +y I -r-y 
The equiUhhum strategies: 
Weak incumbent S fights with probability one in market 2, 
Weak incumbent T fights with probability one in market 2, 
Weak entrant 2 stays out. 
If there was an entry in market 2 then weak entrant 1 stays out if both incumbents fought and 
it enters if at least one of the incumbents accommodated. 
If there was no entry in market 2 then weak entrant 1 stays out. 
The beliefs in the beginning of period 1; 
If there was an entry in market 2 and incumbent i  =  S , T  fought then the posterior probability 
p] that incumbent / is tough is equal to the prior p;. If incumbent i = S,T accommodated in 
period 2 then the posterior probability that incumbent / is weak is equal to 1. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p] = /;f for 
i = SS. 
Since equilibrium strategies prescribe fighting for weak incumbent i = S,T in market 2 
and tough incumbents always fight, Bayes' law implies that the posterior is equal to the 
prior, i.e. p] = p;. Also, the posterior beliefs about an incumbent's type do not depend on 
the other incumbent's play in period 2. This corresponds to the requirement of consistency 
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that defections from equilibrium strategies be perceived by players as uncorrelated events 
(it is straightforv/ard to verity that this requirement is satisfied by all equilibrium 
assessments in this Appendix). One can easily show that assessment, satisfying this 
condition and the requirement that posterior beliefs are computed from priors and 
equilibrium strategies using Bayes' law whenever possible, is consistent in our game. 
Thus, the assessment is consistent. It is also "sensible" since accommodation is perceived 
as a sure sign of weakness (Pr (inc./ is weak | inc./ accommodated in market 2) = I). 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. Note diat since 
prior probabilities (Ps,Pf) lie outside area Fit is optimal for weak entrant 2 to stay out. For 
the same reason weak entrant 1 stays out if there is no entry in period 2. Given 
incumbents' equilibrium strategies, the condition that weak entrant 1 enters if there was an 
entry in period 2 and at least one of the incumbents accommodated, while stays out if both 
incumbents fought is equivalent to the requirement that pair of priors belongs to 
the shaded area of Figure 2.4. Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a 
"sensible" sequential equilibrium we need to prove that given the beliefs and strategies of 
opponents neither of the weak incumbents prefers accommodation to fighting following 
entry into market 2 We consider this condition for the expected utility of weak incumbent 
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S. The case of weak incumbent T is absolutely symmetric. 
Given incumbent Ts equilibrium strategy and the belief structure, the expected utility 
of weak incumbent S from accommodation after entry in market 2 is equal to: 
(A3) £j/s(accommodate) = pf[-c + Eusi* 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+  (I - p \ ) [ - c  + Eus{» 1 inc.T is weak &. inc.S accommodated)], 
where conditional utilities of incumbent S in period 1 have the following form; 
Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = -c; 
£us(* I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent S from fighting, given that there was an entry 
in period 2, is equal to; 
(A4) EMs(fight) = ^ Eusi* 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+ (1 ' - p f ) [ - a  +£m5(* 1 inc.T is weak & inc.S fought)], 
where conditional expected utilities in period 1 have the following form: 
Eus(» 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = q(.-c} + (1 -q) • 1;  
£m5(* 1 inc.T is weak & inc.S fought) = q » 0  +  ( l - q ) »  1. 
Substituting corresponding expressions for period 1 conditional expected utilities into 
(A3) and (A4), we obtain; 
128 
£M5(accommodate) = -(1 + p f ) c ,  
£//5(fight) =  - a  •  p f q c  +  ( I -  9). 
It is easy to note that condition £j/s(accommodate) < EwsCfight) is satisfied under our 
assumptions on the payoff structure. Thus, the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium for the specified range of prior probabilities. 
Equilibrium III; 
Conditions on initial reputations-, pf > Pl < 
The range of prior probabilities satisfying these conditions is depicted as the shaded 
area in Figure 2.5. This shaded area is the rectangle with endpoints (0, ^ ^y), (0,1), 
,  \  - q - b  x \  A  ,  I  - q - b  [  >  ( 7 r. 1) and ( 7 r. t"^—)• 
a - c + l  - q - b  a - c - i - i  - q - b  \ + y  
The equilibrium strategies: 
Weak incumbent S accommodates with probability one in market 2, 
Weak incumbent 7'fights with probability one in market 2, 
Weak entrant 2 stays out. 
If there was an entry in period 2 and both incumbents accommodated then weak entrant 1 
enters, and it stays out otherwise. 
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The beliefs in the beginning of period I: 
• If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent S fought then the posterior probability that it is 
tough is equal to one, and if incumbent S accommodated in period 2 then the probability that it 
is tough is equal to zero. The posterior belief p\- at information sets following entry in period 2 
and fight by incumbent T is equal to the prior pf. The probability of incumbent T being tough 
at information sets following entry in period 2 and accommodation by incumbent T is equal to 
zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p] = p; for 
/ = S,T. 
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period 1 are derived from Bayes' law 
(whenever applicable) given equilibrium strategies and priors. Since weak incumbent S 
accommodates and tough incumbent S fights in market 2, by Bayes' law the posterior 
probability that incumbent S is tough, given that it fought entry in market 2, is equal to one. 
Since equilibrium strategy prescribes fighting for weak incumbent T in market 2 and tough 
incumbent T always fights, Bayes' law implies that the posterior is equal to the prior, i.e. 
Pr = Pf. Thus, the assessment is consistent. It is also "sensible" since accommodation by 
incumbent T is perceived as a sure sign of weakness (Pr (inc. T is weak 1 inc. T 
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accommodated in market 2) = I). 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. Note that since 
prior probabilities (p^,pf) lie outside area Fit is optimal for weak entrant 2 to stay out. For 
the same reason weak entrant 1 stays out if there is no entry in period 2. Weak entrant 1 's 
strategy is also optimal at information sets following entry in period 2. If incumbent T 
fought in market 2 then Pr = pf > (under our condition on initial reputations), 
while if incumbent S fought in market 2 then pj = I, and in both cases weak entrant 1 
strictly prefers to stay out. Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium we need to prove that given the beliefs and strategies of other 
players weak incumbent S prefers accommodation and weak incumbent T prefers fighting 
in market 2. 
Given incumbOTt Ts equilibrium strategy and the belief structure, the expected utility 
of weak incumbent S from accommodation after entry in market 2 is equal to: 
(A5) £Hs(accommodate) = pf[-c + Eus{» 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+ (I -p f ) [ - c  - h E t 4 s i »  1 inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated)], 
where conditional utilities of incumbent S in period 1 have the following form: 
Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = q(.-c) + {I-q)» 1; 
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Eus(» I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated) =^*0 + (l -«/)• 1. 
The expected utility of weak incumbem S from fighting after entry in market 2 is equal 
to; 
(A6) £«s(fighO = + I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+ (1 -pf)[-a + Eusi* I inc.T is weak & inc.S fought)], 
where conditional utilities of weak incumbent S in period 1 have the following form; 
£ms(* I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = qi-c) + (1 - ^ ) • 1; 
Eusi* I inc.T is weak & inc.S fought) =q»0 + {\-q)»\. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S into (A5) and 
(A6), we obtain; 
£M5(accommodate) = -(1 •^pfq)c + (!-<?), 
£«Vi'(fight) = -a -pfqc + (1 - ?). 
It is easy to see that weak incumbent S strictly prefers accommodation to fighting 
(£i/s(accommodate) > £Ms(fight)) since a > c. 
Given incumbent 5's equilibrium strategy and the belief structure, the expected utility 
of weak incumbent T from accommodation after entry in market 2 is equal to; 
(A7) £ur(accommodate) =PI[-C + EUT(» | inc.S is tough & inc.T accommodated)] 
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+ (1 - p ] ) [ 0  +  E u f { »  1 inc.S is weak & inc.T accommodated)], 
where conditional utilities of incumbent T in period 1 have the following form; 
£j/r(« 1 inc.S is tough & inc.T accommodated) = q { - c )  + (1 - q ) »  I; 
Eut(» 1 inc.S is weak & inc.T accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent T from fighting after entry in market 2 is equal 
to; 
(A8) £«7-(fight) = Ps{-<f + I inc.S is tough & inc.T fought)] 
+ (1 -p l ) [ - b  + Eu t ( »  I inc.S is weak & inc.T fought)], 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T in period 1 have the following form; 
E u r i *  1  i n c . S  i s  t o u g h  &  i n c . T  f o u g h t )  =  q i - c )  +  ( 1  - q ) »  I ;  
EUT{* 1 inc.S is weak & inc.T fought) = q »Q +  { l - q ) »  1. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent T into (A7) and 
(A8), we obtain; 
£";/r(accommodate) = -/7j(l + q ) c - i - p l ( l  - q ) ,  
£Mr(fight) = -pla - (I -pl)b-pjqc + (l-q). 
J ^ 
Note that restriction that pi < f r is equivalent to condition 
a  —  c + L — q  —  0  
£!/r(accommodate) < £»7-(fight). Thus, we have shown that conditions on initial 
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reputations are necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium. 
Equilibrium FV; (symmetric to the previous equilibrium). 
Description of this equilibrium is exactly the same as the previous one if one switches 
subscripts S and 7. 
Equilibrium V: 
Conditions on initial reputations: i) pi < 
m  =  \  - q - b  >  0 .  
The range of the prior probabilities that satisfy iii) is the area above curve M of Figure 
•  ^  \  -  q - b  
lOPr  1  T '  a - c +  1  - q - b  
iii) k  •  p I » p f  + 1  •  p j  +  n f  p f  -  m  >  0 ,  
where k  =  c { \ - q - b + a - c )  >  0 ,  I  =  ( a - c ) ( l - h y ) - ( I - q - b ) c  >  0 ,  
2.6. Curve M passes through the points (0,1) and ( 0) (a-c)(l +>•)-(! - q - b ) c '  
Rectangle Z has endpoints (0,0), (0 
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(yq-j-.O) The intersection of the area above M with rectangle Z is nonempty for any 
values of parameters satisfying our initial assumptions (also, curve M is always convex). 
We assume that (a-c)((l +y)-+c) < (1 - q-b)y{\ +c+y). This condition ensures 
that the intersection of the area above curve M and rectangle with endpoints (0,0), 
(0,-rJ—), (-r-5—,-T-J—) and (v^—,0) is empty. Thus, the range of prior probabilities 
l+y  l+^ ' l+y  !+> '  
for which the hypotliesized assessment forms a sequential equilibrium is the 
shaded area of Figure 2.6 (the intersection of the area above M with rectangle Z). 
The equilibrium strategies: 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent S mixes between fighting and accommodation; 
fights with probability P = ^ and accommodates with complementary probability; 
1  - P s  
Weak incumbent T accommodates with probability I in market 2; 
Weak entrant 2 stays out; 
If there was an entry in period 2 then weak entrant 1 mixes between entering and staying out 
after observing that incumbent fought and incumbent T accommodated: stays out with 
probability v = ~Pf)b -Pf<^ enters with complementary probability; weak 
i l - q ) { l - p f )  
entrant I stays out if incumbent T fought in period 2 and enters if both incumbents 
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accommodated. 
If there was no entry in market 2 then weak entrant 1 stays out. 
The beliefs in the beginning of period 1: 
If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent S fought then the posterior probability that it is 
tough is equal to if incumbent S accommodated then the probability that it is 
tough is equal to zero. The posterior belief p\- at information sets following entry in period 2 
and fight by incumbent T is equal to 1. The probability of incumbent T being tough at 
information sets following entry in period 2 and accommodation by incumbent T is equal to 
zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p] = p; for 
/ = S,T. 
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period I are derived from Bayes' law 
(which is applicable everywhere in this case) given equilibrium strategies and priors. By 
Bayes' law the posterior probability that incumbent S is tough, given that it fought entry in 
" • 1 
market 2, is equal to Pr (inc.^ is tough | inc.^ fought) = —;— T:—r. where ^ is 
P s *  1 (1 ~ P s )  *  P 
the probability of weak incumbent S fighting in market 2. Hence, = y~ since p = 
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2 
. And 15 < I under condition i) on inirial reputations. Since weaic incumbent T 
1  - P s  
accommodates and tough incumbent T fights in market 2, by Bayes' law the posterior 
probability that incumbent T is tough given that it fought entry in market 2 is equal to one. 
Thus, the assessment is consistent 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. Note that since 
prior probabilities {p\,pf) lie outside area P^it is optimal for weak entrant 2 to stay out. For 
the same reason weak entrant 1 stays out if there is no entry in period 2. Weak entrant I's 
strategy is also optimal at information sets following entry in period 2. If incumbent T 
fought in market 2 then weak entrant 1 strictly prefers to stay out. And weak entrant 1 is 
willing to mix, after observing a fight by incumbent S and accommodation by incumbent T 
in market 2, since p\ =• j""- ^ nd, hence, weak entrant 1 is indifferent between entering 
and staying out. Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequenrial 
equilibrium it is left to prove that given the beliefs and strategies of opponents weak 
incumbent S is willing to mix and weak incumbent T prefers accommodation in market 2. 
Given incumbent Fs and entrant I's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent S from accommodation is equal to; 
(A9) Ew^Caccommodate) = pf{-c^Eus{* | inc.T is tough &. inc.S accommodated)] 
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+ (1 -/'r)[0 + 1 inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated)], 
where conditional utilities of incumbent S in period 1 have the following form; 
Ell si* I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = qi~c) + (1 -q)» 1; 
E»s(» I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent S from fighting is equal to: 
(A 10) EusCfight) = PT[-^ + Eusi.* (inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+ (! -PT)[-b •^Eusi'* I inc.T is weak & inc.S fought)], 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S in period 1 have die following form; 
Eus{* I inc.T is tough & inc. S fought) = q{-c) + (1 - 9) • 1; 
Eus{» I inc.T is weak & inc. S fought) = [9 + (1 -q){\ - /)]*0 + (1 -9) • y • 1. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S into (A9) and 
(A 10), we obtain: 
£ws(accommodate) = -pK' + <?) • c + p f { \  - q ) ,  
£j/s(fight) = - p f » a - { \  - p f )  •  b  - p f q  • c + l>f + (1 -pf)r](l - q ) .  
Simple algebra shows that if y = then ( l - (7 ) ( l -p f )  
£Ms(accommodate) = £Ms(fight), and, hence, weak incumbent S is willing to mix 
between its two actions. Note, that y < 1 under condition ii) on initial reputations. 
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Given incumbent S ' s  and entrant Ts equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent T from accommodation after entry in market 2 is equal 
to; 
(All) £M7-(accommodate) = Ps[~<^ + ^"r(* I inc.S is tough & inc.T accommodated)] 
+(1 - PI){ P[-C EURI* I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought &. inc.T accommodated)] 
+(1 - /3)[0 +£j/r(* 1 inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated &. inc.T accommodated)] }, 
where conditional utilities of incumbent T in period I have the following form: 
Eut(» I inc.S is tough & inc.T accommodated) = [<7 + (1 - ?)(! - + (I - <7)7 • 1; 
Eut(» I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T accommodated) = (1 - q)y, 
Eut(* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent T from fighting after entry in market 2 is equal 
to: 
(A12)£H7-(fight) = p][-a + Eufi.* | inc.S is tough & inc.T fought)] 
+(1 - PI){ P{-A -r EUT{» 1 inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T fought)] 
+(1 - P){-^ + £«r(* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T fought)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T in period I have the following form; 
EUT{* 1 inc.S is tough & inc.T fought) = qi-c) + ( I  - 9 )  • I ;  
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E u f i *  I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T fought) = (1 - q ) \  
Euri* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T fought) = (1 - q ) .  
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent T  and expression 
for /3 into (A11) and (A12), we obtain; 
£//7-(accommodate) = - p l [ l  + y - y ( \  - q ) ] c + p j y ( l  + y ) ( \  - q ) ,  
£j/r(fight) = - p l { \  + y ) a - ( l  -  p i  -  p h ' ) b  -  p j q c  +  ( I  - q ) .  
If condition iii) on prior probabilities ( P S ^ P F )  holds then weak incumbent T  prefers 
accommodation to fighting. Thus, we have shown that conditions on initial reputations are 
necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a "sensible" sequential 
equilibrium. 
Equilibrium VI: (symmetric to the previous equilibrium). 
Equilibrium VII. 
Conditions on initial reputations: 
( a - c + 1 - < y - 6 ) ( l + y )  a - c  +  l - q - b  
ii) I  - q - b  { a - c + [ - q -  6 ) ( 1  + y )  < P F <  
I  - q - b  
a - c - r  I  - q - b  
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The range of the prior probabilities that satisfy i) and ii) is the shaded area of Figure 
2.7. 
The equilibrium strategies: 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent S  mixes between fighting and accommodation; 
fights with probability Bs = and accommodates with ( 1  - p s ) ( a - c +  1  - q - b )  
complementary probability; 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent T  mixes between fighting and accommodation; 
fights with probability Bf = ^ ~ ~ ^a n d  a c c o m m o d a t e s  w i t h  
^  ^  { l - p f ) i a - c + \ - q - b )  
complementary probability; 
Weak entrant 2 stays out; 
If there was an entry in period 2 and both incumbents accommodated then weak entrant 1 
enters, and it stays out otherwise. 
The beliefs in the beginning of period 1; 
If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent S  fought then the posterior probability that it is 
tough is equal to B— i n c u m b e n t  S  accommodated in period 2 
then die probability that it is tough is equal to zero. If there was an entry in period 2 and 
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incumbent T  fought then the posterior probability that it is tough is equal to 
PI- = ^ ^ and if incumbent T accommodated in period 2 then the [ - Q - B  
probability that it is tough is equal to zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. P ]  =  P ;  for 
/  =  S ,  T .  
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period 1 are derived from Bayes' law 
(which is applicable everywhere in this case) given equilibrium strategies and priors. By 
Bayes' law the posterior probability that incumbent I = S.T is tough, given that it fought 
p- •  I  
entry in market 2, is equal to Pr(inc./ is tough | inc./ fought)=-^;——-^7- —— , 
1  +  (l - P ; ) »  F I ,  
where J3, is the probability of weak incumbent / fighting in market 2. Substituting 
e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  / 3 ,  i n t o  t h i s  f o r m u l a  y i e l d s  P ]  =  ^  F T " "  
I = S,T under conditions i) and ii) 07 < —7—-—r-. Thus, the assessment is 
'  '  A - C +  \  - Q - B  
consistent. 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. The total 
probability that incumbent / fights in market 2 is equal to Pr (inc./ fights in mkt 2) 
= pr • I +(1 -pr) • )8, ^ —J- > -r-^—. Hence, it is optimal for weak 
^  A - C - ^ L - Q - B  I 
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entrant 2 to stay out, £M2(enter) < Euzistay out). 
Weak entrant I stays out if there is no entry in period 2 since the posteriors, which are 
equal to the priors in this case, lie outside area Fof Figure 2.2. Weak entrant 1 's strategy is 
also optimal at information sets following entry in period 2. Note that p] > j"; 
i  =  S , T )  under condition 1 r ^ P 7  on reputations. Hence, it 
'  ( a - c + I  + y )  
is optimal for weak entrant I to stay out if there was an entry in period 2 and at least one of 
the incumbents fought. 
Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
we need to prove that given the beliefs and strategies of opponents weak incumbents are 
willing to mix in market 2. We consider this condition for the expected utility of weak 
incumbent The case of weak incumbent T  is absolutely symmetric. 
Given incumbent Ts and entrant I's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent S  from accommodation is equal to; 
(A13) £i/5(accommodate) = p f [ - c + E u s { »  1 inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+(1 - p f ) {  P T[-C +EUS{» 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S accommodated)] 
+(l - PT)[0 1 inc.T is weak,inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T  in period 1 have the following form: 
143 
Eusi* 1 inc.T is tougii & inc.S accommodated) = q ( - c )  +  ( l  - q )  •  I; 
Eus(* I inc.T is weak, inc.T fougiit & inc.S accommodated) = \  - q \  
Eusi* 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
Tile expected utility of incumbent S  from fighting is equal to; 
(A 14) ^HsCfight) = + Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+(1 -  P f ) {  +  E u s ( *  I inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought)] 
+(1 -/3r)[-^ +Eus(» I inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought)] >, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S  in period 1 have the following form; 
Eus(» 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = <7(-c) + (I -9) • I; 
Ell si* I inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought) = (I - <7) • I; 
Eusi.* 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought) = (I -^) • I. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S  into (A13) and 
(A14), we obtain; 
£j/s(accommodate) = -[pf(I +(?) + (! -P T )P T ]'C  + [pf + (I -pf)/5r]"(I -</), 
£ M s ( f i g h t )  =  - l > f +  ( 1  - P f ) ) 3 r ] « a - [ ( 1  - / ? f ) ( I  - P r J j ' b  - p j q c  +  ( I - q ) .  
Simple algebra shows that £w,(accommodate) =£»/,(fight) (for i = S,T) given 
144 
\ - q - b  -  p H a - c \  -  q - h )  ,  ,  ,  ,  .  ,  .  
B, = =— where j  * /, and, hence, weak incumbent is ( l - p j ) ( a - c + \ - q - b )  
willing to mix between his two actions. Thus, we have shown that conditions on initial 
reputations are necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a "sensible" 
sequential equilibrium. 
Equilibrium VIII; 
Conditions on initial reputations: ip^pr) belongs to the shaded area of Figure 2.8. 
This shaded area is the intersection of area V  and the area above curve M Curve M 
passes through the points (0, ^ ) and (^j^a{a-c) cumbersome 
mathematical formula, that defines boundaries of this area, is not presented in our 
discussion because of space considerations). 
The equilibrium strategies: 
Follov/ing entry in market 2 weak incumbent S  mixes between fighting and accommodation: 
fights with probability Ps = Pg pf ».t-f (1 ^pf)y accommodates with 
[ - P S  I - P F - P F Y  
complementary probability; 
Weak incumbent T  fights with probability I in market 2; 
Weak entrant 2 stays out; 
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If there was an entry in period 2 and both incumbents fought then weak entrant 1 mixes 
between entering and staying out; stays out with probability y = — ^ enters { \  - q ) { \ - i - P f c )  
with complementary probability; weak entrant 1 enters if at least one of the incumbents 
accommodated in period 2. 
If there was no entry in market 2 then weak entrant 1 enters. 
The beliefs in the beginning of period I: 
If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent S  fought then the posterior probability that it is 
1 " * 
tough is equal to Oo ^ , and if incumbent S  accommodated in period 2 
\ + y - p f { l y + \ - x )  
then the probability that it is tough is equal to zero. The posterior belief pf at information sets 
following entry in period 2 and fight by incumbent T is equal to the prior pf. The probability 
of incumbent T being tough at information sets following entry in period 2 and 
accommodation by incumbent T is equal to zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p ]  =  p ;  for 
i = S,T. 
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period 1 are derived from Bayes' law 
(whenever applicable) given equilibrium strategies and priors. By Bayes' law the posterior 
probability that incumbent S is tough, given that it fought entry in market 2, is equal to 
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Pr(inc.5 is tough | inc. / fought) = P s '  1  where ps is the probability of 
1  + ( 1  - p : ) ' I 3 S  '  
weak incumbent fighting in market 2. Substituting expression for /3s into this formula 
weak incumbent T  in market 2 and tough incumbent T  always fights, Bayes' law implies 
that the posterior is equal to the prior, i.e. Px = p}. Thus, the assessment is consistent. It is 
also "sensible" since accommodation by incumbent T is perceived as a sure sign of 
weakness (Pr(inc. T is weak | inc. T accommodated in market 2) = 1). 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. Since weak 
incumbent T fights with probability one in period 2, weak entrant 2 strictly prefers to stay 
out. If there is no entry in period 2 then it is optimal for weak entrant 1 to enter since the 
posterior reputations, which are equal to the priors, lie inside area V of Figure 2.2. Weak 
entrant 1 enters if there was an entry in period 2 and at least one of the incumbents 
accommodated since ips^Pr) s f^in that case. If both incumbents fought in market 2, then 
the expected utility of weak entrant 1 in case of entry is equal to 
£•»/[ (enter | both incumbents fought in mkt 2) 
Substituting expression for p^ formula we obtain £"i/i (enter j both incumbents 
Since equilibrium strategy prescribes fighting for 
= P \ p t ^ - X )  + P K i  - p f ) ( - > ' )  - P s K - y )  +  ( i  - P T )  •  
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fought in mkt 2) = 0, which is equal to weak entrant I's utility if it stays out. Hence, weak 
entrant I is indifferent between its two actions at the information set following entry in 
period 2 and fight by both incumbents. 
Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
we need to prove that given the beliefs and strategies of opponents weak incumbent S is 
willing to mix in market 2 and weak incumbent T prefers fighting to accommodation. 
Given incumbent Ts and entrant I's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent S from accommodation is equal to: 
(A 15) £i/s(accommodate) = pf[-c -^-Eusi* \ inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+ (1 -Pr)[-c + Eusi* I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated)], 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S  in period 1 have the following form: 
Eus(» I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = -c; 
Eus(» I inc.T is weak & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of weak incumbent S  from accommodation is equal to; 
(AI6) £«5(fight) = PT[-<^ + Eusi.* 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
+ (I -pf)[-a + Eus(.» I inc.T is weak & inc.S fought)], 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S  in period I have the following form: 
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Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = [<? + (I - <7)(1 - y)](-c) + (1 - q ) y  •  I; 
Eus(» I inc.T is weak & inc.S fought) = [9 + (I - <7)(l - 7)]*0 + (I - q)Y • 1 
= CI -q)7-
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S  into (A 15) and 
(A 16), we obtain; 
£i/s(accommodate) = -(1 + p f )  •  c ,  
£:ws(fight) =  - a  - p f [ \  -  H  -  q ) r ] » c  - i -  ( I  -  q )  '  y .  
It is easy to see that £z/s(accommodate) = £Ms(fight) for y = — 77^^—t-t-( l - q K l + P f c )  
And, hence, weak incumbent is willing to mix between its two actions in period 2. 
Given incumbent 5"s and entrant I's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent T from accommodation is equal to: 
(A 17) ^j/rCaccommodate) = p\{-c + EUT(* | inc.S is tough &. inc.T accommodated)] 
+(1 -p§){ ^ s[-c £"«r(* I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T accommodated)] 
+(l - I5s)[0 + Euri* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T accommodated)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T in period I have the following form; 
£2/r(* I inc.S is tough & inc.T accommodated) = -c; 
£wr(* I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T accommodated) = 0; 
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Eitri* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of incumbent T  from fighting is equal to: 
(A 18) £i/7-(fight) = pl{-a + EUT^* \ inc.S is tough & inc.T fought)] 
+(1 -Ps){ -i- Eiit(* I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T fought)] 
+ ( 1 -  P s ) [ - h  + £«/(• I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T fought)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T  in period 1 have the following form: 
£wr(« I inc.S is tough & inc.T fought) = [^ + (1 - q ) { \  -7)](-c) + (1 - q ) y  •  I; 
Eut{* I inc.S is weak, inc.S fought & inc.T fought) = (1 - q)Y • 1; 
Eufi* I inc.S is weak,inc.S accommodated & inc.T fought) = 0. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S  into (A17) and 
(A 18), we obtain: 
£//r(accommodat3) = -[2p\ + (1 
£:»r(fight) = + - p j ) l 3 s ] a - [ i l  - p j K l  - P s ) ] » b - p j [ l  -  ( . 1  - q ) r ] c  
+  +  - P 5 ) i S s ] ( l  - q ) r .  
If prior probabilities {p%pf) belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.8, then weak 
incumbent T prefers fighting to accommodation. Thus, we have shown that conditions on 
initial reputations are necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a 
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"sensible" sequential equilibrium. 
Equilibrium iX; (symmetric to the previous equilibrium). 
Equilibrium X; 
Conditions on initial reputations: (pj,pr) belongs to some subset of area F of Figure 
2.2 (we do not plot boundaries of this subset since their shape varies with parameters of 
the model. This subset is nonempty and is strictly smaller than V). 
The equilibriim strategies: 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent S  mixes between fighting and accommodation: 
fights with probability Ps and accommodates with complementary probability; 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent T  mixes between fighting and accommodation; 
fights with probability PT and accommodates with complementary probability; 
Weak entrant 2 enters if and only if 
(A19) |>| + (1 -p5)/3s]|>r + (l -/'f)/3r](-r) +1>5 + (I -/7S);85][(1 -^r)](-y) 
+ [ ( !  - P 5 ) ( I  +  ( 1  - ^ ? ) / J r ] ( - y )  +  ( l  - p I ) ( 1  - P f ) ( l - J 3 s ) ( l  - P r )  >  0; 
and stays out if the reverse inequality holds. 
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If there was an entry in period 2 and it was fought by both incumbents then weai< entrant I 
mixes between its two actions; stays out with probability y, and enters with complementary 
probability; and weak entrant 1 enters otherwise; 
where /3s, P T  and y are given by the following three equations: 
(A20) { { a - c - b ) p f ( \  - p l ) [ b ( p j  - p f ) +  2 y ( a  - c  -  h ) p ^ p f ] } l 3 s  
- ipl[x{a - c - b)]pjpf ^yh(pf -p5)]> = 0; 
(A21) { ( a - c - b } p j ( l  - p h [ f > ( P f - P s ) + ^ y ( ^ - < ^ - b ) P s P f l } / ^ r  
- {Pf[x{a - c - b ) ] p l p f  + y b ( p " s  - p f ) ] }  = 0; 
(A22) 7 = tPj + C1 -p D P s H a  - c - b ] + b  
The beliefs in the beginning of period 1: 
If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent S  fought then the posterior probability that it is 
then the probability that it is tough is equal to zero. If there was an entry in period 2 and 
incumbent T fought then the posterior probability that it is tough is equal to 
tough is equal to p^ -
P I *  I + ( I - P s ) ' / ^ s  
, and if incumbent S  accommodated in period 2 
•7 t 
P f  *  ^  
, and if incumbent T  accommodated in period 2 then the 
probability that it is tough is equal to zero. 
152 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. p \  =  p ;  for 
i  =  S ,  T .  
First, note that posterior probabilities (Ps'Pr) ^he beginning of period 1 are derived 
from Bayes' law (whenever applicable) given equilibrium strategies and priors. Thus, the 
assessment is consistent. 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. If weak entrant 2 
enters its expected utility, given the opponents' equilibrium strategies and prior beliefs, is 
the left hand side of inequality (A 19), while it nets zero if it stays out. Thus, weak entrant 
2's strategy is optimal. If there was no entry in period 2 or if there was an entry and at least 
one of the incumbents accommodated then the posterior beliefs (PS>PT) lis strictly inside 
area V of Figure 2.2, and, hence, "enter" is optimal for weak entrant 1. If there was an 
entry in period 2 that was fought by both incumbents, then the expected utility of weak 
entrant 1 from "enter" is equal to; 
PI . PI (1 -p\)^T / ,N 
Ps +  ( I  - p f i h  Pr + (1 - P T ) P T  ^  ^ Ps + d - P S ) P s  P F  +  (I - P T ) P T  ^  
(1  - P s ) P s  Pr c ,  (1  - P s ) P s  (1  - P f ) P T  
P s  +  (I - P s ) P s  P f  + (I - P T ) P T  P S  + (1 - P s ) P s  P T  + (1 - P T ) P T  
One can easily verify that Ps and Pr from equations (A20) and (A21) are such that this 
expression is equal to zero which is the expected utility of weak entrant 1 if it stays out. 
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Hence, weak entrant 1 is indifferent between its two actions at the information set 
following fight by both incumbents in market 2. 
Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
we need to prove that, given the beliefs and strategies of opponents, weak incumbents are 
willing to mix in market 2. We consider this condition for the expected utility of weak 
incumbent S. The case of weak incumbent T is absolutely symmetric. 
Given incumbent Ts and entrant 1 's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
expected utility of weak incumbent S from accommodation is equal to: 
(A23) £«s(accommodate) = + Ems(* | inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+(1 - pf){ PT[-C Eusi* 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S accommodated)] 
+(1 - I3t)[0 +£ms(* 1 inc.T is weak,inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent T in period 1 have the following form: 
Eus(» I inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated) = -c; 
Eiisi* 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S accommodated) = 0; 
Eusi* I inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of incumbent S  from fighting is equal to: 
(A24) £Ms(fight) = PT [-^ ^ Eiisi* \ inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
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+(1 -pf){ ^ r[-a + Eusi* \ inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought)] 
-i-(l - /3r)[-6 + I inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought)] }, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S  in period I have the following form: 
Eus{* 1 inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = [^ + (1 - ^ )( 1 - 7 )](-c) + (1 - q ) y  *  I;  
Eus{» I inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought) = (1 - q ) y  •  I; 
Eus{» I inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought) = 0. 
Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S  into (A23) and 
(A24), we obtain: 
^MsCaccommodate) = - [ 2 p f  + (1 -/7f)^r]*c, 
EHs(ftght) = -Co?+ (1 -pf)(l -J3r)]'6-(1 -q)r]'c 
+ |>f+ (1 -pf)/3r](l - q ) r -
Substit u t ing e x pressions for /3s, PT and y from (A20), (A21) and (A22) one can verify 
that £m,(accommodate) =£«/,(fight) for i = S,T, and, hence, weak incumbents are 
willing to mix between fighting and accommodation. Thus, we have shown that the 
hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequential equilibrium. 
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Equilibrium XI; 
Conditions on initial reputations: (pl,pf) belongs to the shaded area of Figure 2.9. 
The equilibrium strategies: 
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent S  mixes between fighting and accommodation: 
fights with probability ps = ^ and accommodates with complementary probability; 
1  - P s  
Following entry in market 2 weak incumbent T  mixes between fighting and accommodation; 
fights with probability /3r = ^ and accommodates with complementary probability; 
1 - p f  
Weak entrant 2 enters if ( p j , p f )  belongs to the shaded area of Figure 2.10, and stays out 
otherwise; 
If there was an entry in period 2 that was fought by incumbent S  and accommodated by T ,  
then weak entrant 1 mixes between its two actions; stays out with probability 
^  b  + y )  - p f [ A - b i \  + c + y ) ] - p j p f A c  
^ [1  + y ) - p m ( . c -  +  2 c i l  + ; ' ) ) ] ( 1  - ? ) '  
where^ =(l +y)(l -  q  +  b  -  a )  +  ( 2  + y - q ) c ,  and enters with complementary probability; 
If there was an entry in period 2 that was fought by incumbent T  and accommodated by S ,  
then weak entrant 1 mixes between its two actions: stays out with probability 
y-, = —-——Psl^^ enters with complementary 
[ I  + y ) - p ^ f i c - + 2 c i \  + ; ' ) ) ] ( I  - q )  
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probability; 
If there was an entry in period 2 and both incumbents accommodated then weak entrant 1 
enters, and it stays out if both incumbents fought in period 2. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then weak entrant 1 enters. 
The beliefs in the beginning of period 1: 
If there was an entry in period and incumbent S  fought then the posterior probability that it is 
tough is equal to incumbent .y accommodated in period 2 then the 
probability that it is tough is equal to zero. If there was an entry in period 2 and incumbent T  
fought then the posterior probability that it is tough is equal to pf = ^nd if incumbent 
T  accommodated in period 2 then the probability that he is tough is equal to zero. 
If there was no entry in period 2 then the posteriors are equal to the priors, i.e. pj = p; for 
i = S,T. 
First, we prove that beliefs in the beginning of period 1 are derived from Bayes' law 
(whenever applicable) given equilibrium strategies and priors. By Bayes' law the posterior 
probability that incumbent i = S.T is tough, given that it fought entry in market 2, is equal 
" • I 
to Pr(inc./ is tough | inc./ fought)=-T;—7-^, t:—tt > where p, is the probability of 
P 7 *  i + ( i - p r ) * p .  
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weak incumbent / fighting in market 2. Substituting expression for j3, into this formula 
yields p] = • Thus, the assessment is consistent. 
Now we prove that weak entrants' strategies are sequentially rational. The total 
probability that incumbent / = S.T fights in market 2 is equal to Pr (inc./ fights in mkt 2) 
= • 1 + (1 -p;') * p, = pf(l +y). Given these probabilities, condition Ei/zCenter) 
> £»/2(stay out) is equivalent to the requirement that (PS,PT) belongs to the shaded area of 
Figure 2.10. If there was no entry in period 2 then the poiiterior beliefs (ps^pr) lie strictly 
inside area F'of Figure 2.2, and, hence, weak entrant 1 enters. Weak entrant I's strategy is 
a l s o  s e q u e n t i a l l y  r a t i o n a l  a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t s  f o l l o v ^ n g  e n t r y  i n  p e r i o d  2 ,  s i n c e  p ]  =  
(for / = S.'I) if incumbent / fought and, hence, weak entrant 1 is indifferent between "stay 
out" and "enter" if one incumbent fought and the other accommodated in period 2, and it 
strictly prefers to stay out if both incumbents fought. 
Thus, to show that the hypothesized assessment is a "sensible" sequential equilibrium 
we need to prove diat given the beliefs and strategies of opponents weak incumbents are 
willing to mix in market 2. We consider diis condition for the expected utility of weak 
incumbent S. The case of weak incumbent T is absolutely symmetric. 
Given incumbent T s  and entrant I's equilibrium strategies and the belief structure, the 
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expected utility of weak incumbent S  from accommodation is equal to; 
(A25) £//s(accommodate) = p j [ ~ c  + E u s ( »  | inc.T is tough & inc.S accommodated)] 
+  (1 - P T ) {  P T [ - C  + EUS{» I inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S accommodated)] 
+(1 - /?7-)[0 + Eus{* I inc.T is weak,inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated)] 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S in period 1 have the following form; 
£j/s(* I inc.T is tough & inc 
accommodated) = [<7 + (1 -f/)(l - >'2)](-c) + (1 -q)y2 • 1; 
Eus{» I inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S accommodated) = (1 - q)yi, 
Eus{» 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S accommodated) = 0. 
The expected utility of incumbent S  from fighting is equal to: 
(A26) £Ms(fight) = PT[-<I +£ms(* I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought)] 
- P T ) {  P R L - A  E U S I *  1 inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought)] 
+ (1 - i3r)[-6 + Eiis(.* 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought)] >, 
where conditional expected utilities of incumbent S  in period 1 have the following form; 
Eusi* I inc.T is tough & inc.S fought) = q{-c) + (I - 9) • 1; 
Eus(.» 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T fought & inc.S fought) = (1 - (?) • 1; 
Eus(.» 1 inc.T is weak, inc.T accommodated & inc.S fought) = (1 - q)Yi • I. 
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Substituting expressions for conditional utilities of weak incumbent S  and expression 
for into (A25) and (A26), we obtain; 
£Ms(accommodate) = - p j [ 2 - ^ y - Y 2 { \  - q ) ] » c - ¥ p f i \  +y)(l -<7)7:, 
£i/5(fight) = - p f { \  •f;;)«a-[l -  p f - p f y ] ' b  -  p \ q  »  c  ^ \ p f { \  +>') + (l -p\-ph)'Y\ M ^  
If weak incumbents are willing to randomize dien they have to be indifferent between 
fighting and accommodation. It is easy to verify that (accommodate) = EM,(fight) (for 
i = S,T) for 7i and 72 specified in the description of the equilibrium. 
Requirement that prior probabilities (Ps^Pr) belong to the shaded area of Figure 2.9 is 
equivalent to conditions 0 < 7, < I for / = 1,2. Thus, we have shown that conditions on 
initial reputations are necessary and sufficient for the specified assessment to be a 
"sensible" sequential equilibrium. 
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NOTES 
1. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) call it a Stackelberg payoff. However, this term is 
commonly used for g'JCwo) in the recent game theory literature. 
2. That is, after each period the large player learns a measure of small players in each 
state that have chosen a particular action. But the large player is unable to observe action 
chosen by any particular small player since deviations by sets of small players of measure 
zero do not affect realization of joint distribution over actions and states. 
3. For excellent surveys of literature on strategic entry deterrence, see Gilbert (1989), 
Tirole (l988),Ware (1991) and Wilson (1992). 
4. Prices can often be changed within a very short period of time and, hence, do not 
have a commitment value. 
5. Assumption of nondurability of entry deterrence technology requires that investment 
in this technology by any firm in the sequence of potential entrants affects directly only 
payoffs to the next entrant. 
6. Given an industry structure, firms that are using the deterring technology may or 
may not be more profitable than those using normal technology. 
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7. Church and Ware's model is similar to that of Economides' (1993) analysis, where 
firms make entry decisions simultaneously and afterwards play a Stackelberg game. 
8. For a recent treatment of informational asymmetry, see Salonen (1994). 
9. This chapter of dissertation is a close version of Melkonian and Johnson (1998). 
10. In a game of perfect information, players move sequentially and each player knows 
all previous moves when making his decision, that is, all information sets are singletons. 
The backward induction argument is: solve for the optimal choice of the last player 
depending on each possible history of the game, and then solve for the optimal choice of 
the next to the last mover given that the last mover will make his/her optimal choice. 
11. When N  =  1, this game coincides with the one depicted in Figure 3.2. 
12.For two player games, the sets of coalition-proof and Pareto undominated equilibria 
coincide. 
13. We do not present an algorithm for finding sequential equilibria of the game since 
it is similar to the one used to find equilibria of multiple versions of the "chain-store" game 
(Kreps and Wilson (1982b), Milgrom and Roberts (1982b)). 
14. Beliefs of player 2 about player 1 are such that any failure to implement the policy 
announced is perceived as a sure sign of non-commitment. 
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